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TOWARD A STRONGER FINANCIAL 
HISTORY ANTIDISCRIMINATION NORM 
Lea Shepard* 
Abstract: This Article examines a topic at the intersection of consumer 
protection and antidiscrimination law: the use by employers and licensing 
organizations of applicants’ credit reports and financial histories in the 
hiring and licensing processes. The Article begins with a broad normative 
assessment of the merits of the practice by examining applicable “logics of 
personhood,” categories of a framework of antidiscrimination analysis 
that assesses whether traditionally unprotected groups are entitled to 
formal antidiscrimination safeguards. Thus, the Article considers whether 
financial histories validly and reliably reflect personality traits relevant to 
job performance. It then examines to what extent the use of financial his-
tory in the employment and licensing settings is a necessary and helpful 
deterrent to debt default—long regarded as a socially undesirable prac-
tice. Next, the Article evaluates the practice’s impact on traditionally dis-
advantaged groups by assessing its relationship to racial equality and so-
cial mobility. Finally, in a novel application of behavioral economics to the 
area of credit reports and financial history, this Article suggests that, in 
spite of the difficult conceptual distinctions between consumer debtors 
and traditional Title VII categories like race, sex, and national origin, the 
findings of behavioral economists suggest that an adverse financial status 
is more immutable than neoclassical economists have been willing to 
concede. These observations lend critical normative support to legislative 
efforts to establish a stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm. 
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[History is] the most difficult of all the sciences. 
—Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges 
Introduction 
 An individual’s financial past—the amount of debt that she has 
accumulated, the payments that she has failed to make, the judgments 
that creditors have recovered against her, and any bankruptcy protec-
tion that she has sought—has a formidable impact on her life. Credit 
scores and credit history impact whether and at what cost she can bor-
row money to purchase a home and a car.1 They influence the prices 
businesses charge for products like credit cards and auto insurance.2 A 
growing number of employers consider financial history in scrutinizing 
job applicants.3 Bar examiners and other licensing organizations con-
sider applicants’ repayment histories in assessing their fitness to join 
particular professions.4 Landlords look at financial histories in evaluat-
ing prospective renters.5 An increasing number of utilities and cell 
phone carriers use credit reports and scores to price deposits for their 
services.6 Additionally, debt burdens and bankruptcy filings can affect 
an employee’s ability to secure or retain her security clearance.7 For 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 Matt Fellowes, Brookings Inst., Credit Scores, Reports, and Getting Ahead 




4 See, e.g., Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir. 1975) (discussing 
the use of credit history by medical boards); Niles Jackson, Bankruptcy as It Affects Character 
and Fitness, 72 B. Examiner, no. 4, 2003 at 6, 12 (discussing bar examiners’ consideration 
of law school graduates’ bankruptcy filings when evaluating applications for admission to 
the bar). 
5 Fellowes, supra note 1, at 2. 
6 Id.; Baynes v. Alltel Wireless of Ala., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1313–14 (M.D. Ala. 
2004) (discussing a scenario in which a consumer was required to pay a higher security 
deposit to a wireless telecommunications provider because of adverse information in her 
credit report). 
7 See, e.g., Bankruptcy, U.S. Air Force Acad., http://www.usafa.edu/superintendent/ 
ja/bankruptcy.cfm?catname (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (explaining that whether a bank-
ruptcy filing can affect one’s security clearance depends on various factors, including 
“whether the bankruptcy was caused primarily by an unexpected event . . . or by financial 
irresponsibility”). The effect of a bankruptcy filing on an individual’s ability to secure or 
retain a job, however, is complex. While a bankruptcy filing may signal to a current or 
prospective employer that an individual is financially irresponsible, see infra notes 116–136 
and accompanying text, it may alternatively be interpreted as a positive path toward reha-
bilitation of the debtor’s financial status because it combines debt forgiveness with debt 
collection. See, e.g., Legal Office: Bankruptcy, supra (noting that filing for bankruptcy “may 
actually be viewed as an indication of financial responsibility,” because someone with size-
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these reasons, financial histories—including credit reports and scores— 
have been described as some of “the most powerful determinants of 
modern American consumer life.”8 
 In recent years, one widespread use of financial histories— em-
ployers’ and licensing organizations’ consideration of applicants’ fi-
nancial backgrounds—has attracted significant scrutiny. Legislators and 
policymakers have questioned the logic and ethics of employers’ and 
licensing organizations’ two primary uses of financial histories: (1) to 
gauge an applicant’s propensity to steal from customers or clients,9 and 
(2) to use an applicant’s financial history as a barometer of financial 
responsibility, which employers interpret as a reflection of her capacity 
to serve as a responsible employee or licensee.10 Some federal and state 
legislators have sought to limit employers’ consideration of applicants’ 
credit histories absent a reasonably clear relationship between the ap-
plicant’s financial transgression and his or her ability to perform the 
responsibilities demanded by the position.11 Legal commentators have 
                                                                                                                      
 
able outstanding debts may pose a higher security risk than someone who has filed for 
bankruptcy); see also Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy 
Outcomes, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 103, 140 (2011) (citing an interview with a debtor who pursued a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy hoping to retain a security clearance). One bankruptcy judge 
opined on the extent to which a bankruptcy filing could interfere with a debtor’s future 
employment prospects: 
Bankruptcy is a serious step; it holds its stigmas still. It is a unique judicial 
process where one is laid bare, financially. And remember this—it results in a 
court record for future employers, creditors, friends, relatives and the public 
to see. Would you grant a security clearance to one who cannot manage his 
financial affairs and files bankruptcy? I only ask the question. Some would 
and some would not. 
In re Raymond, 12 B.R. 906, 907 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981). 
8 Fellowes, supra note 1, at 2. 
9 See infra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 116–136 and accompanying text. 
11 Several states, including California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Ore-
gon, and Washington, have passed laws limiting employers’ consideration of credit reports. 
Cal. Lab. Code § 1024.5 (West Supp. 2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51tt (West Supp. 
2012); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378-2(a)(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
70/10 (2010); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-711 (West Supp. 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 659A.320 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.182.020 (2007); see also Use of Credit Information 
in Employment 2011 Legislation, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www. 
ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-information-in-employment-2011-legis.aspx 
(last updated Dec. 19, 2011) (outlining 2011 legislation in twenty-nine states limiting the 
use of credit reports and credit history by employers). In 2009, federal legislators intro-
duced the Equal Employment for All Act, which proposed to amend the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act to restrict employers’ use of credit reports. H.R. 3149, 111th Cong. (2009). As 
I subsequently discuss, however, existing and proposed laws that restrict employers’ use of 
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voiced concerns about bar examiners’ consideration of applicants’ stu-
dent loan debt levels and repayment capabilities in determining appli-
cants’ professional fitness.12 Some bankruptcy practitioners have sug-
gested that the Bankruptcy Code’s prohibition of public employers’ 
refusal to hire bankruptcy filers should be likewise applied to private 
sector employers.13 In response, employers have defended their right 
to consider financial histories in the hiring process, arguing that they 
can glean meaningful information about the merits and employability 
of job applicants from applicants’ credit reports.14 
                                                                                                                     
 In this Article, I consider whether, and to what extent, the law 
should more rigorously limit employers’ and licensing organizations’ 
consideration of individuals’ financial histories. Should the law prevent 
individuals with adverse credit histories, high debt loads, debt defaults, 
or bankruptcies from being treated differently by employers or licens-
ing organizations? What valid distinctions, if any, can be made among 
members of these groups? In exploring these questions, I assess how 
debtors’ financial histories have become inextricable from their indi-
vidual identities, whether the practice is a necessary and effective sup-
plement to norms and laws encouraging debt repayment, the lack of 
clarity surrounding consumers’ ability to enter into financial transac-
tions that maximize their welfare, and the importance of a robust fi-
nancial history antidiscrimination norm to racial and economic equal-
ity. To traverse “the complex, shifting, and often muddy terrain”15 of 
 
credit reports actually embrace—rather than reject—prevailing preconceptions about 
debtors. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
12 See, e.g., John Zulkey, Character & Fitness & Credit History: Failing the Character and Fit-
ness Review over Student Loan Debt, 21 Prof. Law., no. 1, 2011 at 4, 4–5 (arguing that law 
students who have defaulted on their student loan obligations should not be disqualified 
from practice and recommending that the American Bar Association adopt measures to 
encourage law schools to reduce tuition and increase loan-repayment assistance). 
13 Michael R. Herz, The Scarlet D: Bankruptcy Filing and Employment Discrimination, Am. 
Bankr. Inst. J., Apr. 16, 2011, at 16, 89; see 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2006). 
14 See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Meeting of Oct. 20, 2010—Employer Use of 
Credit History as a Screening Tool [hereinafter EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record] (statement of 
Pamela Quigley Devata), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2012); Kathy Gurchiek, SHRM: Credit Checks Are Legitimate Screening Tool, Soc’y for Human 
Res. Mgmt. (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/about/news/Pages/LegitimateScreening 
Tool.aspx; see also EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat’l, No. 75-166-N, 1977 WL 15340, at 
*15 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 1977) (finding that the use of preemployment credit reports by an em-
ployer in the bank industry was permissible so long as it was not racially discriminatory on its 
face). 
15 Anna Kirkland, Fat Rights: Dilemmas of Difference and Personhood 2 (2008). 
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antidiscrimination law, I examine applicable “logics of personhood,”16 a 
phrase that refers to a framework of antidiscrimination analysis that can 
be used to assess whether particular groups are entitled to antidiscrimi-
nation protection. 
 After examining the empirical rationales for using financial history 
in employment and licensing as well as the practice’s adverse impact on 
racial equality and social mobility, I recommend a significant expansion 
in existing financial history antidiscrimination laws. In a novel applica-
tion of behavioral economics to the area of credit reports and financial 
history, I argue that the findings of behavioral economists suggest that 
a stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm is necessary to 
protect individuals from the consequences of decisions that increas-
ingly appear more analogous to immutable characteristics that receive 
more substantial protection under current antidiscrimination laws. 
 This Article is the first to conduct a broad normative analysis of 
financial-history discrimination.17 The Article considers not only em-
ployers’ and licensing organizations’ use of credit reports, but also their 
use of other reports of financial histories, including, for example, 
bankruptcy filings reflected in public records. As legislators continue to 
consider whether or not to restrict employers’ use of credit histories, it 
is critical to engage in a more comprehensive analytical inquiry—one 
that will inform legislators’ and policymakers’ conclusions about how 
and to what extent to limit employers’ access to information that has 
for decades been perceived as relevant and helpful. The Article’s objec-
tive is to generate a more nuanced and comprehensive debate about 
the merits of reducing the role of financial history in an individual’s 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. at 2–3 (describing the logics of personhood as “forms of reasoning about what 
persons are—specifically, ways we explain to each other how and why someone’s traits 
should or should not matter for judging what is really important about her”). 
17 Existing scholarship has focused on discrete dimensions of financial history dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Loren W. Brown, Credit Report: An Acceptable Aid to the Hiring Decision?, 
39 W. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (2011); John C. Chobot, Anti-Discrimination Under the Bankruptcy 
Laws, 60 Am. Bankr. L.J. 185 (1986); Roberto Concepción, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks: 
Effectuating Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities Under the Guise of Job-Relatedness and Business 
Necessity, 12 Scholar 523 (2010); Deborah Thorne, Personal Bankruptcy and the Credit Re-
port: Conflicting Mechanisms of Social Mobility, J. Poverty, Oct. 17, 2008, at 23; Ruth Des-
mond, Comment, Consumer Credit Reports and Privacy in the Employment Context: The Fair 
Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Employment for All Act, 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 907 (2010); Kelly 
Gallagher, Note, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting Act: When Requesting Credit Reports for 
“Employment Purposes” Goes Too Far, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1593 (2006). 
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pursuit of a job, which is a resource that philosopher Anthony Appiah 
has described as “essential to a dignified autonomous life.”18 
 Part I of this Article juxtaposes creditors’ traditional use of credit 
reports—to assess credit applicants’ “creditworthiness” —and employ-
ers’ and licensing organizations’ non-credit uses of credit reports and 
financial histories. It reviews the findings of several social science studies 
that attempt to measure the relationship between an adverse financial 
history and specific personality traits relevant to job performance.19 Part 
II considers various arguments for and against establishing a stronger 
antidiscrimination norm in the area of financial history. It considers a 
critical question insufficiently explored in the legal literature: how and 
whether policies embracing empirical observations about individuals 
with adverse financial backgrounds can be reconciled with other impor-
tant social goals, including the promotion of racial equality and social 
mobility.20 Part III explains why a stronger financial history antidis-
crimination norm is necessary to overcome key deficiencies in current 
laws and is preferable to alternatives.21 
I. The Increasing Importance of Financial History in the 
Pursuit of Credit and Career 
A. Creditors’ Use of Financial History 
 Traditionally, an individual’s financial background has been used 
primarily by creditors to decide whether and under what terms a con-
sumer will receive a mortgage or other loan. Creditors have long used 
consumer reports (more informally known as “credit reports”)22 to 
evaluate consumers’ eligibility for mortgages, credit cards, and other 
credit products. Consumer reports contain a wealth of information 
                                                                                                                      
18 K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 41, 46 
(2000). 
19 See infra notes 22–153 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 154–279 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 280–418 and accompanying text. 
22 The term “consumer report” encompasses “credit reports” as well as reports issued 
to non-creditor users of reports, including prospective insurers, employers, and landlords. 
See Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Consumers’ Data: 
Policy Issues Raised by ChoicePoint, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of 
Representatives 6–7 (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050315protecting 
consumerdata.pdf. 
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about American consumers, including personal information,23 pay-
ment history,24 inquiry history,25 and public record information.26 
Some consumer reports include credit scores, which are a numeral rat-
ing of a consumer’s “creditworthiness.”27 Creditors purchase consumer 
reports from consumer reporting agencies (commonly known as 
“credit reporting agencies” or credit bureaus”),28 organizations that 
create and maintain such records on virtually every American adult.29 
                                                                                                                     
 Economists view credit reports as a critical risk-mitigation tool 
since credit reports can help a credit grantor assess a prospective bor-
rower’s likelihood of repaying a particular loan.30 When a consumer 
applies for credit, a creditor can analyze the applicant’s financial his-
tory to reduce adverse selection problems.31 Credit products—like in-
surance policies32—may be more likely to attract riskier borrowers be-
 
23 Personal information includes a consumer’s name, address, Social Security number, 
date of birth, previous address, employer, and phone number. Evan Hendricks, Credit 
Scores & Credit Reports: How the System Really Works, What You Can Do 81–82 
(2005). 
24 Payment history details a consumer’s record of repayment on her mortgage, auto 
loans, installment loans, credit cards, and department store cards. Id. at 19. 
25 A consumer report lists which employers and creditors requested the report within 
the last two years. Chi Chi Wu & Elizabeth De Armond, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., 
Fair Credit Reporting § 3.2.3.2 (7th ed. 2010). 
26 Public record information includes tax liens, bankruptcies, court judgments, and 
foreclosures. Id. 
27 Id. As I note below, however, employers do not have access to credit scores; rather, 
consumer reporting agencies provide employers only with the raw data in consumer re-
ports. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
28 The term “consumer reporting agency” is broader than the term “credit bureau.” A 
consumer reporting agency encompasses “credit bureaus” as well as many other entities 
whose primary focus does not involve reporting consumer credit information to prospec-
tive creditors. See Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 1.2.1. Examples of these consumer 
reporting agencies include tenant screening bureaus and employment screening agencies. 
Id. 
29 Anthony Rodriguez et al., Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Fair Credit Reporting 
§ 4.1 (5th ed. 2002) (“The three major agencies will have a file on virtually every adult 
American . . . .”). 
30 Robert M. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit Reporting in America 
4–5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 02-21, 2002), available at http:// 
www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/wp02-21.pdf (“The 
availability of data on a universe of credit users . . . makes it possible to develop sophisticated 
models to select and price credit risk for unsecured consumer loans.”). 
31 See Fair Credit Reporting: Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the S. 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 66 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings, Fair Credit Re-
porting] (statement of Lewis B. Stone, Assistant Counsel to Governor Rockefeller, State of 
New York) (explaining that credit reports allow “the costs of bad credit risks [to] be appor-
tioned to those that are bad credit risks”); Hunt, supra note 30, at 4–5. 
32 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 47–48 (6th ed. 2012). 
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cause any given credit applicant generally has more information than 
do prospective creditors about that applicant’s likelihood of defaulting 
on a particular debt.33 To minimize these information asymmetries and 
reduce the risk that any given group of credit applicants will contain a 
disproportionate number of individuals who are more likely to default, 
creditors can use an applicant’s credit history to differentiate between 
more and less “creditworthy” individuals.34 For example, a creditor 
might decide not to lend to an applicant lacking a sufficiently long and 
regular record of prompt debt repayment, or one whose outstanding 
loan balances exhaust a relatively high percentage of her total credit 
limits.35 Alternatively or additionally, a creditor can reduce anticipated 
losses by charging higher fees or interest rates to borrowers who appear 
more likely to default.36 
 Creditors utilizing credit reports also attempt to shape borrower 
behavior by reducing moral hazard problems.37 After a creditor has 
extended credit to a borrower, that creditor can deter the debtor from 
defaulting by threatening to report any delinquency to one or more 
credit bureaus.38 The more accurate and the more comprehensive the 
                                                                                                                      
 
33 See World Bank & Int’l Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Assessment: A Hand-
book 256–57 (2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/pdf/ch10. 
pdf (“Credit reporting addresses a fundamental problem of credit markets: asymmetric in-
formation between borrowers and lenders, which leads to adverse selection and moral haz-
ard.”); John M. Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports: Lessons from 
the U.S. Experience, in Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy 273, 
276 (Margaret J. Miller ed., 2003) (“Lending markets almost always display some degree of 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers typically have more accu-
rate information than lenders about their willingness and ability to repay a loan.”). 
34 See Hunt, supra note 30, at 3–4. 
35 What’s in My FICO Score, How My FICO Score Is Calculated, myFICO, http://www.my 
fico.com/CreditEducation/WhatsInYourScore.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing 
the extent to which certain categories of information are used in calculating a consumer’s 
credit score). 
36 The practice of charging riskier borrowers higher fees and interest rates is known as 
“risk-based pricing.” See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational 
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1481, 1516 (2006) (discussing how creditors can maximize profitability through risk-
based pricing and sub-prime lending); Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of 
Risk-Based Pricing, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 123, 126–27 (2007) (discussing risk-based pricing 
in the home mortgage market). 
37 See World Bank & Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 33, at 257 (“[C]redit-
reporting mechanisms strengthen incentives for borrowers to repay and thus reduce moral 
hazard because late or nonpayment with one institution can result in sanctions from many 
others.”); Hunt, supra note 30, at 4. 
38 See, e.g., World Bank, General Principles for Credit Reporting 8 (2011), http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Credit_Reporting_text.pdf 
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information in a consumer’s credit report, and the greater the number 
of creditors and other entities who use credit reports in rendering 
meaningful decisions about consumers, the more likely that (1) past 
defaults will affect a borrower’s future eligibility for loans, and that (2) 
creditors’ threats to report defaults to credit bureaus will shape con-
sumers’ behavior.39 
 Because they provide data with which creditors can develop mod-
els to predict and price credit risk, credit reports and credit scores have 
been lauded for reducing delinquency rates,40 dramatically increasing 
the speed of the loan application process,41 and contributing to a sig-
nificant expansion of unsecured credit.42 Credit reports have thus in-
creased creditor profits, expanded consumers’ access to credit, and 
helped keep credit prices down. For these reasons, credit reports have 
been interpreted (at least conceptually) as a win-win, benefitting con-
sumers and creditors alike.43 
                                                                                                                      
(describing how credit reporting systems, databases of information on debtors, can “[s]erve 
to discipline debtor behavior”). 
39 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 
86 Calif. L. Rev. 479, 483 (1998). In other words, “network effects” are present in the 
credit reporting industry because consumer reports become more useful and effective as 
both the coverage of consumers and the number of participating creditors increase. Hunt, 
supra note 30, at 6. 
40 See Peter L. McCorkell, The Impact of Credit Scoring and Automated Underwriting on 
Credit Availability, in The Impact of Public Policy on Consumer Credit 209, 213 (Tho-
mas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (concluding that credit reports, compared 
to judgmental evaluation methods, reduce delinquency rates by twenty to thirty percent). 
41 See World Bank & Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 33, at 257 (explaining that 
credit reporting can increase efficiency by reducing the loan processing time, thereby 
lowering costs); Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 1.2.2 (noting that consumer reports 
increase the speed of credit transactions because creditors have nearly instantaneous ac-
cess to consumer reports). 
42 See Barron & Staten, supra note 33, at 273 (“[C]redit bureau data have made a wide 
range of credit products available to millions of households that would have been turned 
down as too risky just a generation ago.”); see also Use of Credit Information Beyond Lending: 
Issues and Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 125 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings, Beyond Lending] 
(statement of Stuart K. Pratt, Consumer Data Industry Association) (noting that if credi-
tors are forced to remove accurate data, consumer credit costs may increase, reducing the 
availability of credit). 
43 See Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 1.2.2 (“Consumer credit reporting can bene-
fit both credit grantors and consumers.”). This sentiment was also expressed in the legisla-
tive history of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006), the federal 
statute that regulates the consumer reporting industry. Hearings, Fair Credit Reporting, supra 
note 31, at 1 (statement of Sen. William Proxmire, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. 
& Consumer Credit) (explaining that “[t]here is no argument with the proposition that 
both consumers and industry need an efficient and accurate credit reporting system”). 
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 Many consider creditors’ use of credit reports essential to the fair 
and democratic distribution and pricing of credit. Credit reports seem-
ingly impose a meritocratic system whereby those consumers who regu-
larly repay their debts are eligible for the cheapest future loans. Before 
credit scores were widely used, higher-risk borrowers (most notably, 
communities of color) were more likely to be denied loans altogether,44 
and lenders used more subjective measures to evaluate prospective bor-
rowers.45 Credit reports have thus been perceived as instrumental to 
social mobility (both internationally and domestically) and to the crea-
tion and viability of a strong middle class.46 
 Creditors’ use of consumers’ financial histories has not been with-
out controversy. Many argue that consumer reports are error-ridden, a 
problem that can cause creditors and employers to make serious mis-
takes in rendering decisions about consumers and prospective employ-
ees.47 Commentators also note that consumer reporting agencies in-
adequately protect consumers’ privacy,48 which can contribute to 
identity theft.49 And others argue that the specific criteria used by credi-
tors to calculate credit scores have a disparate impact on minority com-
munities.50 
                                                                                                                      
44 Fellowes, supra note 1, at 17 n.5 (explaining that the “high risk” market was largely 
ignored before credit scores were invented). 
45 Before the introduction of credit scoring, credit decisions were made “manually” by 
a loan officer. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress on 
Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit O-
4 (2007) [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Bd., Credit Scoring], http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. This decision method, known as 
“judgmental” underwriting, was subjective, inconsistent, and costly. Id. 
46 World Bank, supra note 38, at v (“Poor financial infrastructure [including a lack of 
effective credit reporting systems] in many developing countries poses a considerable con-
straint upon financial institutions to expand their offering of financial services to under-
served segments of the population and the economy.”). 
47 See infra notes 140–142 and accompanying text. 
48 See, e.g., Hearings, Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. 
Proxmire) (describing how the computerization of credit reports “opens the way toward a 
gigantic national data bank which could include extremely personal information on every 
American citizen”). 
49 Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 1.2.2 (explaining that credit reporting agencies’ 
“extensive collection of information, and the vast numbers of consumers on whom they 
report, creates serious concerns about the accuracy of information they keep and about 
the adequacy of their measures designed to protect consumer privacy, including protec-
tion from identity theft”). 
50 See, e.g., Fed. Reserve Bd., Credit Scoring, supra note 45, at 51 (“Others have ex-
pressed the view that the credit-scoring process itself and some of the factors within credit-
scoring models may disadvantage minorities or other segments of the population pro-
tected by fair lending laws.”). 
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 Few, however, have questioned the central rationale underlying 
creditors’ consideration of financial histories: assuming that creditors’ 
methodologies are reliable, valid, and nondiscriminatory,51 it is reason-
able for a creditor to consider a consumer’s borrowing history in decid-
ing whether and under what terms to grant a consumer a future loan. 
The nexus between a creditor’s economic role—lending money to con-
sumer borrowers—and its primary evaluative tool—reviewing a con-
sumer’s record of debt repayment—has been perceived as intuitively 
logical and as robust.52 Commentators have thus generally questioned 
how—not whether—creditors should consider applicants’ financial his-
tories in deciding whether or not to extend credit.53 
 Credit reports are designed to differentiate. They help creditors 
draw relevant distinctions between otherwise anonymous debtors  whose 
relationship with current and former creditors is ambiguous or un-
known.54 What is less clear, however, is to what extent a consumer’s fi-
nancial history is relevant in assessing a prospective employee’s merits, a 
topic that I will explore in the following section. 
B. Employers’ and Licensing Organizations’ Use of Financial History 
 Over the past several decades, the use of credit reports and finan-
cial histories has expanded beyond the financial domain, as financial 
histories have been adopted as predictive and evaluative tools in various 
non-credit settings. Insurance companies, for example, use consumer 
reports in deciding whether to issue or cancel policies, determining the 
terms of such policies, and pricing insurance rates.55 Government 
agencies use consumer reports to evaluate consumers’ eligibility for 
public assistance benefits.56 Some professional licensing organizations, 
                                                                                                                      
51 This is, of course, a critical assumption, and one that many have challenged. See infra 
notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
52 See Dee Pridgen & Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Credit and the Law § 2:1 
(2011) (explaining that when the “consumer applies for a car loan or a new credit card, 
the consumer will normally fill out a credit application that requests a great deal of per-
sonal information” and that most consumers “accept this as necessary for the creditor to 
determine whether or not they will be a good risk”). 
53 See id.; Edwin J. Griffith, Credit Reporting, Prescreened Lists, and Adverse Action: The Im-
pact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 46 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1, 
62–63 (2009). 
54 Hunt, supra note 30, at 4–5 (“[C]redit bureaus enable the maintenance of reputa-
tion effects in a market consisting of millions of otherwise anonymous borrowers.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
55 Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 7.2.5. 
56 Id. § 7.2.6. 
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like bar examiners, scrutinize applicants’ financial histories in assessing 
applicants’ fitness to join certain professions.57 
 Significantly, all of these groups utilize financial histories not to 
assess a consumer’s likelihood of repaying particular debts,58 but to 
predict or assess some other quality or behavior. In other words, with 
non-credit uses of financial history, the intuitive link between the eval-
uative tool—review of a consumer’s relationships with current and 
former creditors—and these organizations’ assessment goals is more 
tenuous, or at least not immediately obvious. As a result, non-credit us-
es of financial history merit independent scrutiny. 
 The use of credit reports in the employment sector has become 
commonplace.59 An increasing percentage of employers consider ap-
plicants’ credit reports in filling part- and full-time positions, treating 
financial history as predictive of the personality traits that make an in-
dividual a good or bad employee. Employer surveys indicate that 60% 
of employers utilized credit reports in 2010,60 compared to 35% of em-
ployers in 2003,61 and 13% in 1996.62 Employers’ and licensing organi-
zations’ use of financial histories may increase in leaner job markets, 
when employers and licensing organizations search for additional ways 
to differentiate efficiently between larger numbers of candidates.63 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. (discussing the permissible use of credit histories in the fields of law and medicine). 
58 See infra notes 79–95 and accompanying text (discussing how some licensing organi-
zations may evaluate prospective licensees’ financial histories to assess applicants’ standing, 
not to make substantive predictions about applicants’ personality traits). 
59 Financial histories may be used at any stage of the employment process. For instance, 
they may be used to assess the merits of job applicants or new entrants to a particular profes-
sion or even to evaluate current employees for promotion or retention. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681b(b) (2006) (defining “consumer reports” to include those used for “employment 
purposes”); id. § 1681a(h) (defining “employment purposes” as the use of a consumer report 
to evaluate a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment, or retention). This Arti-
cle focuses primarily on the former use: scrutiny of the financial histories of those seeking to 
obtain a new job or enter a particular profession. See infra notes 60–99 and accompanying 
text. 
60 Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Background Checking: Conducting Credit Back-
ground Checks SHRM Poll 3 ( Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Background Checking], http:// 
www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundChecking.aspx. 
61 Evren Esen, Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Workplace Violence Survey 19 
(2004), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/Workplace 
%20Violence%20Survey.pdf (reporting that 35% of employers used credit checks in 2003, 
compared to 19% in 1996). 
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., Desmond, supra note 17, at 907–08 (explaining that the recent increase in 
employers’ use of credit reports might be a result of the recession and the high demand 
for jobs). 
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 Significantly, although an increasing number of employers use 
credit report data, employers generally do not utilize credit scores.64 
The three nationwide credit bureaus refuse to provide employers with 
access to credit scores.65 In reviewing an applicant’s credit history and 
assessing his or her relative merits, employers instead scrutinize particu-
lar pieces of adverse information, including bankruptcy filings and col-
lection actions.66 Although employers’ interpretations of these raw data 
may be idiosyncratic, surveys reveal some commonalities among em-
ployers. Approximately two-thirds of employers report that they are 
likely to consider current outstanding judgments when determining 
whether to extend a job offer.67 Approximately half of employers report 
that they are influenced by debts in collection.68 One-quarter of em-
ployers consider bankruptcy.69 Less than one in five employers report 
that they consider high debt-to-income ratios, foreclosures, tax liens, 
education-related debt, and medical debt.70 
 Employers and employer advocates downplay the importance of 
credit reports in the evaluation process. They contend that credit re-
ports are used in a relatively small percentage of total credit evalua-
tions.71 According to some sources, only about 13%72 to 19%73 of em-
ployers routinely perform credit checks on all job candidates. 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Leslie Callaway & Mark Kruhm, Servicemember Disclosure a Must on All Mortgages, 
A.B.A. Banking J., Oct. 2010, at 64, 64 (reporting that Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion 
decline to provide credit scores to employers for hiring purposes). 
65 Id. Credit bureaus do not share credit scores with employers, presumably because 
credit-scoring algorithms are designed specifically for lending and not for other purposes. 
One could make the same argument, however, about the raw data on credit reports. This 
Article questions the logic and ethics of the importation to the employment setting of all 
variations of a tool designed specifically for creditor use. 
66 See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
67 Maureen Minehan, Could a Credit Check Land You in Court?, 28 Emp. Alert 1 (Feb. 8, 
2011) (citing survey conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. Courts have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code’s antidiscrimination provisions, 11 
U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b) (2006), to authorize private, but not public, employers to deny em-
ployment to a current or former bankruptcy filer. See infra notes 325–402 and accompany-
ing text. 
70 Minehan, supra note 67. 
71 See, e.g., Hearings, Beyond Lending, supra note 42, at 43–44 (statement of Stuart K. 
Pratt) (testifying that credit reports are consulted in approximately 15% of all background 
checks). 
72 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Christine V. Walters) (tes-
tifying that only 13% of organizations conduct credit checks on all job candidates). 
73 Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 7.2.4.1.2 (stating that only 19% of employers 
checked credit reports of all applicants in 1996, but that 47% of employers checked credit 
reports of some applicants in 2009). 
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 Those who defend employers’ use of credit reports also point out 
that in most cases, credit reports are used only in the final stages of hir-
ing and not to prescreen job applicants.74 Likewise, employers do not 
use credit reports in filling every position—only specific ones.75 Accord-
ing to the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), employ-
ers generally conduct credit checks only for certain positions involving 
financial or fiduciary responsibilities, senior executive positions, and 
positions where employees will have access to highly confidential em-
ployee information.76 As I discuss later, however, employers’ use of fi-
nancial histories to fill positions involving sensitive job responsibilities 
rests on strong, unsupported preconceptions about debtor behavior, 
including a belief that consumers with adverse financial backgrounds 
are more likely to commit theft.77 In addition, the use of financial histo-
ries to fill highly compensated and prestigious senior executive positions 
may have a negative impact on racial equality and social mobility.78 
 Employers are not the only groups that consider applicants’ finan-
cial histories. In addition, certain licensing organizations evaluate ap-
plicants’ debt repayment histories in determining whether applicants 
have satisfied specific professional membership qualifications. For ex-
ample, state bar examiners consider applicants’ debt levels and rela-
tionships with current and former creditors as part of character and 
fitness evaluations.79 Many states request a copy of or reserve the right 
to pull a bar applicant’s credit report.80 In questionnaires sent to appli-
cants’ references as part of background investigations, some bar exam-
                                                                                                                      
74 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Christine V. Walters) (tes-
tifying that 57% of organizations initiate credit checks only after granting a contingent 
offer, and 30% of organizations do so after a job interview). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See infra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra notes 191–246 and accompanying text. 
79 See Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs & Am. Bar Ass’n, Comprehensive Guide 
to Bar Admission Requirements viii (2012), available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/ 
media_files/Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf (describing “neglect of financial responsibili-
ties” as “relevant conduct” in the assessment of an applicant’s character and fitness). 
80 See, e.g., Ill. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, Rules Governing 
the Legal Profession and Judiciary in Illinois r. 5 (2007), http://www.iardc.org/ 
rulesadmissions.html (explaining that a character investigation and report will be pre-
pared with information received from employers, former employers, colleges and universi-
ties, law schools, other bar admitting authorities, courts, law enforcement agencies, credi-
tors, credit reporting agencies, former spouses and character references); Va. Bd. of Bar 
Exam’rs, Applicant’s Character & Fitness Questionnaire 15 (n.d.), http://www.vbbe. 
state.va.us/pdf/LRC&FQuestion.pdf (requiring that applicants submit a recent credit 
report with their Character and Fitness Questionnaires). 
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iners ask employers, friends, colleagues, and professors whether or not 
the applicant has ever filed for bankruptcy.81 
 In one very controversial case, In re Application of Griffin, the Ohio 
Supreme Court rejected a law school graduate’s application to sit for 
the bar exam because the applicant had neglected his financial obliga-
tions.82 The applicant, who worked part-time at a public defender’s of-
fice, owed $170,000 in student loan debt and $16,500 in credit card 
debt at the time of his law school graduation.83 The court concluded 
that the applicant had exhibited financial irresponsibility in choosing 
to remain in his part-time position in the hope that it would lead to a 
full-time position following the applicant’s passage of the bar exam.84 
The court indicated that, had the applicant instead sought a full-time 
position, he could have more easily paid down his debts and could have 
qualified for additional deferment of his student loan obligations.85 
 Several months prior to the examining board’s decision, the appli-
cant had indicated that he intended to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 
but, by the date of the hearing, he had not yet filed.86 The court sug-
gested that, even if the applicant had filed for bankruptcy, the outcome 
of the case would not have been different.87 A bankruptcy filing, ac-
cording to the court, would not have significantly improved the appli-
cant’s financial status because his student loan debt was nondischarge-
able.88 
 In re Griffin may be an outlier. Many applicants who are denied 
admission to the bar for exercising financial irresponsibility exhibit ad-
ditional complicating problems, including, for example, criminal mis-
conduct.89 In re Griffin nonetheless reflects the dramatic ability of a li-
censing organization to scrutinize and second-guess not only an 
                                                                                                                      
81 See, e.g., Letter from Tara Henrikson, Ill. Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, to author ( Ju-
ly 1, 2010) (on file with author). 
82 943 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ohio 2011) (per curiam). 
83 Id. at 1009. 
84 Id. at 1010. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1009. 
87 See id. 
88 In re Griffin, 943 N.E.2d at 1009. 
89 See, e.g., In re Application of Hyland, 663 A.2d 1309, 1316 (Md. 1995) (denying the 
state bar application of a candidate who had failed both to file federal income taxes and to 
honor his other financial obligations); see also In re Application of Stern, 943 A.2d 1247, 
1257–59 (Md. 2008) (holding that a state bar applicant did not satisfy character and fitness 
requirements because the applicant had (1) demonstrated financial irresponsibility (but 
not criminal misconduct) by failing to disclose all adverse information on his bar applica-
tion and (2) engaged in an inappropriate relationship with an underage female). 
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applicant’s financial decisions, but also his or her life choices.90 As a 
result, an applicant who has incurred tens of thousands of dollars in 
debt and the opportunity cost of a law school education may potentially 
be deprived entry into his or her chosen profession. Such an applicant 
faces an economic catch-22: improvement in his or her financial stand-
ing is necessary to secure the license he or she needs to advance in the 
profession, but meaningful improvement in his or her financial status 
requires access to a job within his or her chosen field. While such poli-
cies may encourage debt repayment,91 they may discourage the neces-
sary risk-taking that is often required to improve one’s life standing.92 
 In other professions—including medicine, dentistry, and teach-
ing—some state licensing authorities consider whether or not appli-
cants and existing licensees have defaulted on certain debts.93 These 
licensing organizations focus primarily, if not exclusively, on applicants’ 
records of repayment of three categories of debts: (1) student loans, 
(2) taxes, and (3) familial support obligations, like alimony and child 
support.94 If an applicant has defaulted on one of these debts, some 
licensing authorities will refuse to grant the candidate entry into the 
profession until the applicant has promised to repay the loan.95 
 In 2008, Congress passed a law, the Secure and Fair Enforcement 
for Mortgage Licensing Act (“SAFE Act”), which establishes heightened 
registration requirements for mortgage loan originators.96 The statute 
requires mortgage loan originators to “demonstrate[ ] financial respon-
sibility, character, and general fitness such as to command the confi-
dence of the community and to warrant a determination that the loan 
                                                                                                                      
90 See In re Griffin, 945 N.E.2d at 1010. 
91 See infra notes 156–190 and accompanying text. 
92 See infra notes 228–246 and accompanying text. 
93 See, e.g., Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that a physician’s consumer report, which was issued to the state board of medical examin-
ers after the physician applied for a license to practice medicine, was a “consumer report” 
subject to the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)); Jay Greene, Debt 
Deadbeats Risk Losing Medical Licenses, Am. Med. News, Aug. 13, 2001, at 1–2, 4. 
94 See infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text. 
95 Telephone Interview with Dr. Eileen Lewalski, Prof’l Affairs Manager, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Bds. of Pharmacy (Feb. 29, 2012) (explaining that in Illinois and other states, a prospective 
licensee’s failure to pay child support and/or student loans can impact licensure); Telephone 
Interview with Dr. Alex Siegel, Former President, Ass’n of State & Provincial Psychology Bds. 
(Feb. 29, 2012) (explaining that some licensing boards may consider child support repay-
ment history; however, this rule is not universal). 
96 S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act, Title V of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116 
(Supp. IV 2010)). 
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originator will operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently.”97 To fulfill these 
goals, all applicants must submit a credit report to a nationwide mort-
gage licensing and registration system.98 State authorities may consider 
these reports in assessing applicants’ financial responsibility.99 
 In subsequent sections, I explore whether employers’ and licens-
ing organizations’ uses of financial histories are supported empirically 
or whether the practice reflects more uninformed, stereotypical judg-
ments about consumer behavior. I also consider to what extent this 
practice may encourage debt repayment but have a deleterious impact 
on social mobility and racial equality. 
C. Empirical Realities: What Makes an Individual with an Adverse  
Financial History Different 
 What does a consumer’s financial history reveal? How are those 
with adverse financial histories different from the rest of the popula-
tion, both as individuals and as employees? Employers and licensing 
organizations articulate two primary justifications for considering ap-
plicants’ financial histories: (1) they help employers gauge an appli-
cant’s propensity to steal from customers or clients (which I will refer to 
as the “Fraud Hypothesis”), and (2) they reflect an applicant’s level of 
financial responsibility, which can help employers and others predict 
how responsible he or she will be as an employee or licensee (which I 
will refer to as the “Responsibility Hypothesis”).100 
 As I discuss below, there is little to no evidence to support the 
Fraud Hypothesis. There is, however, some evidence to support the Re-
sponsibility Hypothesis. The challenge for lawmakers and academics is 
to fashion legal rules and antidiscrimination policies that sufficiently 
take into account empirical realities (including their known and un-
known limitations) without neglecting important countervailing nor-
mative policies. 
1. The Fraud Hypothesis 
 Employers most frequently consult applicants’ financial histories to 
attempt to identify those who are more likely to commit theft or fraud 
                                                                                                                      
97 12 U.S.C. § 5104(b)(3). 
98 Id. § 5104(a)(2)(A). 
99 See Heather Hill Cernoch, NMLS Adds Credit Report Functionality for SAFE Act Compliance, 
DsNews.com (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/nmls-adds-credit-report-
functionality-for-safe-act-compliance-2010-11-03. 
100 See infra notes 101–136 and accompanying text. 
1712 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1695 
or to accept bribes.101 Some employers, for example, have expressed 
concern that an employee with financial problems is more likely to 
embezzle money.102 Additionally, some employers are apprehensive 
that an overextended employee might be tempted to commit identity 
theft by stealing customers’ and others’ personal and financial informa-
tion.103 Employers frequently consult the financial histories of appli-
cants who, in their jobs, would have access to cash or credit card infor-
mation.104 Similarly, bar examiners have suggested that applicants with 
adverse financial histories are, as lawyers, more likely to steal from cli-
ents.105 The federal government, in granting security clearances, con-
siders those with adverse financial backgrounds to pose a higher secu-
rity risk because they are presumed to be more susceptible to blackmail 
and bribery.106 Consistent with these perceived risks, credit reporting 
agencies market credit reports to businesses as prudent, money-saving 
risk-mitigation tools.107 Because the Fraud Hypothesis is widely em-
                                                                                                                      
 
101 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Michael Aamodt). 
102 Drew DeSilver, Too Good a Look? Credit Histories Are Being Used for a Lot More Than De-
ciding Who Gets a Loan, Chi. Trib., Sept. 27, 2000, at D1 (“Employers often justify checking 
credit histories by citing the need to protect themselves from pilfering or embezzle-
ment.”). 
103 See Hearings, Beyond Lending, supra note 42, at 44 (statement of Stuart K. Pratt) (ex-
plaining that a prohibition on employer use of credit reports would render employers, 
other employees, and customers more vulnerable to fraud and identity theft). 
104 See Background Checking, supra note 60, at 5 (reporting that ninety-one percent of 
employers conduct credit background checks on employees charged with fiduciary and 
financial tasks, including the responsibility of handling cash). 
105 Lori E. Shaw, What Does It Take to Satisfy Character and Fitness Requirements?, Student 
Law., Oct. 2008, at 12. One bar examiner has stated: 
I think the concern ultimately centers around the issue of protection of the 
public. Before admitting someone to the bar, I believe that the members of 
Character and Fitness Committees want to be sure that the financial pressures 
on a new lawyer will not be such that the lawyer will be tempted to take ad-
vantage of a client . . . . 
Id. at 14. 
106 Sean Reilly, Personal Debt Sinks More Clearances, Fed. Times, Nov. 14, 2011, at 18 (ex-
plaining that a high debt load “could heighten someone’s vulnerability to bribery or 
blackmail”). Additionally, many federal government and federal contractor positions re-
quire employees to obtain a security clearance as a condition of employment. Genevieve 
Loutinsky, Comment, The Needs of War and the Right to Fair Process in Seeking a Security Clear-
ance, 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 543, 543 (2010). 
107 See, e.g., Qualify Employees, Sarma, http://www.sarma.com/solutions/qualify-employees 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2012) (“Experts have suggested the cost of even one bad hiring decision 
can be as much as $100,000 taking into account the time spent recruiting, hiring, and train-
ing, as well as the amount of time the job is left incomplete or performed poorly by an un-
qualified applicant. In addition, the financial cost from theft, violence, etc., can be enor-
mous, not to mention the risk of damaging employee morale and the entity’s reputation.”). 
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braced, employment attorneys have encouraged employers who use 
consumer reports to include “sensitive responsibilities in job descrip-
tions” to avert possible discrimination claims.108 
 As others have argued, though, the Fraud Hypothesis lacks mean-
ingful empirical support.109 Employers and employer advocates have 
pointed to studies indicating that individuals who have committed fi-
nancial crimes have experienced financial stress.110 These studies, how-
ever, do not establish a general correlation between financial stress and 
propensity to commit financial crimes because researchers lack a repre-
sentative sample of job applicants.111 Thus, it is unclear what percent-
age of all employees experiencing financial stress refrain from commit-
ting theft or fraud. In addition, a 2011 study published in the Journal of 
Applied Psychology indicated that an employee’s credit score was unre-
lated to workplace deviance (e.g., theft).112 
 The Fraud Hypothesis poses a significant challenge, because it is 
widely entrenched in popular and legal culture. Because credit scores 
                                                                                                                      
These claims have gained traction during the recent recession because employers—eager to 
cut costs and avoid unnecessary losses—may have embraced credit reports as an indispensa-
ble screening tool. See Heather Huhman, When Employers Look into Your Credit History, U.S. 
News & World Rep. ( July 22, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-
voices-careers/2011/07/22/when-employers-look-into-your-credit-history (“Some employers 
believe people with large debts or credit problems could be more likely to steal or commit 
fraud, which organizations can’t afford, especially in today’s down economy.”); Jim Sanders, 
Ban on Checking Credit of Job Applicants Clears Assembly, Sacramento Bee (May 19, 2011, 4:49 
PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2011/05/ban-on-checking-credit-of-job.html 
(citing one state legislator as saying that credit reports can help employers reduce future 
litigation and loss, and “[i]n small business, every little bit counts”). 
108 Mary Swanton, Employers Can Deny Jobs Based on Bankruptcy, InsideCounsel, Mar. 1, 
2011, at 56, 57, available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/03/01/employers-can-deny-
job-based-on-bankruptcy. 
109 See, e.g., U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Meeting of May 16, 2007—On Em-
ployment Testing and Screening, [hereinafter EEOC, May 16 Hearing Record] (statement of Adam 
T. Klein), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/5-16-07/ (“To our knowledge, cred-
it checks as a basis for employment decisions is a practice validated by no studies . . . .”). 
110 See, e.g., EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Christine V. Wal-
ters). 
111 See id. 
112 Jeremy B. Bernerth et al., An Empirical Investigation of Dispositional Antecedents and 
Performance-Related Outcomes of Credit Scores, 97 J. Applied Psychol. 469, 474 (2012). Be-
cause employers do not use credit scores, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, study 
results on credit scores may not be easily extrapolated to the employment setting. Never-
theless, there is good reason to believe that employers’ use of the raw data in credit reports 
has a disparate impact on minorities. For example, minority groups file for bankruptcy 
more often than do non-minorities. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Fragile Middle 
Class: Americans in Debt 234 fig.7.4 (2000) (showing a greater percentage of minority 
homeowners in bankruptcy compared to non-minority homeowners in 1997). 
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are strongly correlated with race,113 the Fraud Hypothesis may per-
petuate an insidious stereotype that minorities are more likely to com-
mit crimes.114 Even those states that have passed laws limiting employ-
ers’ use of credit reports permit employers to consult financial histories 
if the position involves (1) access to an expense account or corporate 
debit or credit cards, (2) the exercise of fiduciary responsibility (e.g., 
the power to issue payments, collect debts, transfer money, or enter in-
to contracts), (3) access to third parties’ personal or financial informa-
tion, (4) access to confidential information, including trade secrets, or 
(5) access to valuable assets, including, for example, library or museum 
collections or prescription drugs.115 These categories can be inter-
preted broadly to encompass a large percentage of jobs. Thus, existing 
financial history antidiscrimination laws embrace—rather than reject— 
the Fraud Hypothesis. 
2. The Responsibility Hypothesis 
 Many employers have long believed that an applicant’s financial 
history contains clues that can help employers determine whether an 
applicant possesses key traits related to responsibility and job productiv-
ity. These employers might attribute excessive indebtedness and default 
to poor financial planning, an inability to control one’s impulses, or 
apathy toward fulfilling one’s financial obligations or promises.116 Some 
employers have concluded that financial weakness may make an appli-
                                                                                                                      
113 See infra notes 191–223 and accompanying text. 
114 EEOC, May 16 Hearing Record, supra note 109 (statement of Adam T. Klein) 
(“[G]iven that African American applicants are more likely to have bad credit, this notion 
of risk of theft also fosters a shameful racial stereotype.”). 
115 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51tt (West Supp. 2012) (excluding positions 
that involve access to personal or financial information other than information commonly 
provided in a retail position; fiduciary responsibilities; access to an expense account or 
corporate cards; access to confidential business information, including trade secrets; or 
access to the employer’s nonfinancial assets valued at $2500 or more, including museum 
and library collections and prescription drugs); 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/10 (2011) (ex-
cluding from the general ban on employers’ use of credit history positions that involve 
access to cash or marketable assets valued at $2500 or more and positions that involve ac-
cess to confidential information); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-711 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2011) (exempting positions that involve access to personal information; fiduciary respon-
sibility to the employer (including the power to issue payments, collect debts, transfer 
money, or enter into contracts); access to an expense account or corporate debit or credit 
cards; or access to other confidential business information, including trade secrets). 
116 See Huhman, supra note 107, at 99 (“Your credit report gives employers a sense of 
your responsibility level in your personal life. If you haven’t done anything to improve your 
credit or [if you] continue to be irresponsible with money, it’s a bad sign for employers 
looking to hire you.”). 
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cant a less reliable employee (i.e., one who shows up to work less fre-
quently or fails to fulfill job obligations).117 As one executive articu-
lated, “[i]f you cannot organize your finances, how are you going to 
responsibly organize yourself for a company?”118 
 This view—which I describe as the “Responsibility Hypothesis” — 
presupposes that 
individuals who have a habit of not following through on pre-
vious promises (as represented by unpaid balances or late 
payments) or not having the foresight to plan ahead (as rep-
resented by recent financial activity that requires borrowing of 
money) would be reasonably expected to continue such be-
havior in the future, including in the workplace.119 
Until quite recently, employers relied primarily on anecdotal evidence 
to support this claim.120 In the aftermath of the recent recession, how-
ever, which has been marked by protracted high unemployment, em-
ployers’ use of financial histories has come under increasing scrutiny.121 
This has triggered calls for additional empirical analyses of the validity 
of the practice.122 
 Employers have long relied on personality tests and other assess-
ment tools to help deduce whether or not an applicant possesses cer-
tain traits that will help a firm or organization reach its stated goals.123 
The question presently posed to social scientists is whether financial 
histories, like personality tests, validly and consistently predict the like-
lihood that applicants will exhibit important work-related qualities and 
behaviors, like conscientiousness, agreeableness, and discipline. 
 Few studies directly address this question. A 2011 study published 
in the Journal of Applied Psychology attempted to measure the correlation 
between credit scores and specific personality traits relevant to job per-
formance.124 Using supervisor assessments, credit (FICO) scores, and 
                                                                                                                      
117 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Richard Tonowski). 
118 Diane E. Lewis, Qualification: Must Have a Good Credit History, Bos. Globe, Sept. 5, 
2006, at E1. 
119 Bernerth et al., supra note 112, at 470. 
120 Id. at 469. 
121 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 2–3; Concepción, supra note 17, at 524; Desmond, 
supra note 17, at 907. 
122 See, e.g., Bernerth et al., supra note 112, at 470 (“Despite the claims of practitioners 
and credit reporting agencies, there exists virtually no empirical evidence to confirm or 
refute the proposed antecedents and outcomes of credit scores.”). 
123 See Gregory M. Hurtz & John J. Donovan, Personality and Job Performance: The Big Five 
Revisited, 85 J. Applied Psychol. 869, 869 (2000). 
124 Bernerth et al., supra note 112, at 470. 
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personality data collected from employees, researchers concluded that 
conscientiousness, task performance, and citizenship behaviors were 
positively correlated with credit scores.125 These findings might lend 
limited support to the idea that credit scores and responsibility are 
linked. 
 This study has noteworthy limitations, though. For example, the 
researchers in this study observed a correlation between certain per-
sonality traits and credit scores.126 Employers, however, do not use cred-
it scores in the assessment process.127 They have access only to specific 
lists of financial events, like defaults, collection actions, and bankruptcy 
filings.128 As a result, employers might process these raw data very dif-
ferently (and far less consistently) than do consumer reporting agen-
cies’ algorithms.129 Thus, the tentative conclusions of this study are not 
necessarily applicable to real-world uses of credit reports by employers 
and licensing organizations.130 
 Likewise, this study’s sample may have been insufficiently represen-
tative because it measured only the personality traits of individuals who 
were currently employed. The study (presumably for feasibility reasons) 
did not measure the conscientiousness levels of individuals who were 
currently seeking a job or who were otherwise unemployed.131 As a re-
sult, the study might have overstated the connection between credit 
score and conscientiousness, since presently employed individuals may 
inherently be more likely to be evaluated positively by their supervisors. 
 Various commentators have responded to similar studies by argu-
ing that employees should be judged primarily, if not exclusively, by 
their ability to perform a given job, and not by any other metrics. One 
consumer advocate who testified before the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) posed the following dichotomy: “Funda-
                                                                                                                      
125 Id. at 472–73. Employees who exhibit ”organizational citizenship behavior” might, 
for example, give advance notice when they are unable to work and assist other employees 
who have heavy workloads. Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See supra notes 64 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
129 In this way, employers’ use of the raw data in credit reports resembles judgmental 
underwriting, a subjective and inconsistent assessment method that creditors utilized be-
fore credit scores were introduced. See Fed. Reserve Bd., Credit Scoring, supra note 45, 
at O-4. 
130 For example, employers appear to focus primarily—if not exclusively—on specific 
adverse information (e.g., bankruptcy filings or collection actions). Unlike creditors, em-
ployers may not necessarily consider the length of a consumers’ credit history or the lack 
of a credit history. See Background Checking, supra note 60, at 7. 
131 See Bernerth et al., supra note 112, at 472. 
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mentally, the issue at stake is whether workers are fairly judged based 
on their ability to perform a job or whether they’re discriminated 
against because of their credit history.”132 The difficult and unexplored 
question that lawmakers and social scientists must address is whether 
financial histories are, in fact, valid measures of crucial qualities—like 
conscientiousness—that are manifested in both credit reports and in 
the workplace. In other words, can credit histories—used by approxi-
mately sixty percent of employers133 and an increasing number of li-
censing organizations—reflect personality traits that are part and parcel 
of that set of skills and qualities that prospective employees market to 
employers? If so, how should the law (particularly antidiscrimination 
law) respond? 
 Likewise, even if key traits like conscientiousness are manifested in 
financial histories, and even if these traits have some predictive validity 
in the employment setting, it is crucial to assess to what extent these 
qualities are within an individual’s control. Questions about the extent 
to which an adverse financial history should be considered in assessing 
a prospective employee’s merits implicates a central and often intracta-
ble question in many antidiscrimination debates: whether or not the 
quality that makes a group different is immutable (i.e., outside of the 
group’s control) or mutable (i.e., capable of being avoided, or at least 
minimized, through different life choices). The law affords greater pro-
tection against discrimination to those who cannot strip themselves of 
those characteristics that make them unique.134 Some might interpret 
financial misfortune as more analogous to traditional Title VII catego-
ries like race and sex. Those at the opposite end of the spectrum, in 
contrast, would perceive many—if not most—consumers who have ex-
perienced financial misfortune as more comparable to other groups 
who have struggled to convince policymakers and the public that those 
essential qualities that make them different cannot be controlled—or 
can be controlled only with great difficulty.135 Later in the Article, I 
                                                                                                                      
132 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Chi Chi Wu) (emphasis 
added). 
133 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
134 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining that racial classifications deserve heightened scrutiny); 
Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1483, 1487 (2011). 
135 See, e.g., White v. Kentuckiana Livestock Mkt., Inc., 397 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that an individual who has filed for bankruptcy is different from one who seeks 
protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of her race or sex or, 
under the Age Discrimination Act, because of her age). 
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consider to what extent behavioral economists’ findings suggest that 
consumer choices are predictably and systematically irrational, and thus 
more analogous to traditional immutable characteristics.136 
3. Additional Rationales 
 Employers and licensing organizations consult applicants’ finan-
cial histories for a variety of secondary reasons, in addition to fraud and 
irresponsibility risk-detection.137 To assess the potential direct discrimi-
natory impact of these additional practices, one may consider to what 
extent employers or licensing organizations are using applicants’ finan-
cial histories to make substantive predictions about applicants’ propen-
sity to exhibit deviant behavior or job irresponsibility. In other words, it 
is helpful to consider to what extent these rationales rely on the Fraud 
or Responsibility Hypotheses. 
 Some of employers’ additional uses of financial history are less de-
pendent on the Fraud and Responsibility Hypotheses and, for this rea-
son, may pose less significant normative complications. Others, how-
ever, are closely intertwined with these rationales and reflect the extent 
to which the Fraud and Responsibility Hypotheses have, even in the 
absence of conclusive empirical evidence, become entrenched in socie-
tal views and narratives about consumer behavior. 
a. Credit Reports as an Information-Verification Tool 
 Some employers use credit reports for a seemingly innocuous ad-
ministrative purpose: to help verify applicants’ identities or other infor-
mation listed on job candidates’ application forms or resumes.138 Em-
ployers have, for example, used credit reports to confirm applicants’ 
Social Security numbers, current and former residences, and employ-
ment history.139 
 Employers’ use of credit reports as an information-verification 
method is arguably less problematic from a discrimination standpoint, 
since this use is not substantially premised on either the Fraud or Re-
sponsibility Hypothesis. It is possible that employers who identify dis-
crepancies between applicants’ credit reports and applications or re-
sumes may make negative inferences about candidates’ honesty or 
trustworthiness. Employers using credit reports primarily or exclusively 
                                                                                                                      
136 See infra notes 247–279 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 138–153 and accompanying text. 
138 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Richard Tonowski). 
139 Id. 
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as an information-verification tool, however, are not necessarily also 
using an applicant’s financial history to make substantive judgments 
and predictions about whether applicants possess certain favorable or 
unfavorable personality traits. As a result, this use of financial history, in 
and of itself, does not implicate the antidiscrimination issues addressed 
in this Article. 
 Nonetheless, using credit reports as a routine information-
verification tool is ill-advised. Consumer reports are replete with er-
rors.140 Inaccuracies are common because consumer reporting agen-
cies are compensated by users of reports, like creditors and employers, 
and not by consumers themselves.141 As a result, apart from concerns 
about litigation or regulatory enforcement, consumer reporting agen-
cies do not have a significant direct financial incentive to limit inaccu-
racies. Because consumer reporting agencies often erroneously report 
both a consumer’s biographical information and her payment history, 
employers should instead use other methods, like background screen-
ing, to verify basic information supplied by applicants.142 
                                                                                                                     
 Although employers’ use of credit reports as an information-
verification method does not directly and substantially implicate either 
the Fraud or Responsibility Hypothesis, employers’ administrative use 
of credit reports may nonetheless raise ancillary discrimination con-
cerns. Employers’ use of biographical information contained in credit 
reports increases the likelihood that employers, if only out of perceived 
convenience or a desire to maximize the value of their expenditures on 
reports, will also consult applicants’ payment histories to make infer-
ences about applicants’ personality traits. Thus, employers’ use of con-
sumer reports as an information-verification mechanism may, by facili-
tating the predictive use of reports, legitimize and entrench consumer 
reports as a useful substantive assessment tool in the employment set-
 
140 See Alison Cassady & Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S. Pub. Interest Res. Grp., Mis-
takes Do Happen: A Look at Errors in Consumer Credit Reports, (2004), http://cdn. 
publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/BEevuv19a3KzsATRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2004.pdf 
(concluding in a study of 154 consumers in thirty states that 79% of credit reports contained 
one or more errors, and that 25% of the reports contained an error serious enough to cause 
a denial of credit). 
141 See Marcy E. Peek, Beyond Contract: Utilizing Restitution to Reach Shadow Offenders and 
Safeguard Information Privacy, in Securing Privacy in the Internet Age 137, 139 (Anu-
pam Chander et al. eds., 2008) (describing third-party data brokers, like consumer report-
ing agencies, as “shadow offenders,” because they lack privity of contract with consumers 
and therefore often escape liability for mishandling consumers’ data). 
142 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Richard Tonowski) 
(“[Basic biographical information] might be obtained from background screening provid-
ers without the applicant’s financial details.”). 
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ting. For this reason, even the seemingly benign administrative use of 
credit reports is relevant to an antidiscrimination analysis. 
b. Debtor-Creditor Relationship Between Employer and Applicant 
 In addition, some employers may refuse to hire an applicant who 
has defaulted on one or more debts owed to the employer or to a re-
lated corporate entity.143 It is possible that these decisions rest heavily on 
the Fraud or Responsibility Hypothesis, since the employer, upon con-
sultation of an applicant’s financial background, may have made certain 
adverse predictions about the applicant’s likelihood of committing 
fraud or theft or about his or her ability to serve as a responsible em-
ployee. Additionally or alternatively, such decisions may be perceived as 
an attempt to punish debt default, a justification I examine later in this 
Article.144 
c. Negligent Hiring 
 Some employers and credit reporting agencies argue that, without 
a thorough review of a candidate’s financial background, an employer 
might be exposing itself to claims of negligent hiring.145 If an employee 
ultimately commits fraud or theft, the victim might sue the employer, 
claiming that the employer was negligent in failing to conduct a more 
thorough review of the applicant’s criminal or financial history.146 A 
more comprehensive background check, a plaintiff might argue, might 
have reflected noteworthy “red flags” that could have suggested that 
closer supervision of the employee was necessary. 
 As I discuss later, however, there are few to no cases in which em-
ployers have been successfully sued for failure to scrutinize an em-
ployee’s financial background, suggesting that an antidiscrimination 
rule is crucial not only to protect debtors from adverse actions that rest 
                                                                                                                      
143 Such a situation may arise when an employee of a large institution, like a hospital 
or a university, incurs a debt at that institution (i.e., as a patient or a student, respectively). 
See, e.g., Leonard v. St. Rose Dominican Hosp. (In re Majewski), 310 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 
2002) (ruling on an antidiscrimination claim of a hospital employee, who was fired after 
he defaulted on debts owed to the hospital and after the hospital learned that the em-
ployee intended to file for bankruptcy). 
144 See infra notes 156–190 and accompanying text. 
145 Background Checking, supra note 60, at 10 (reporting that twenty-seven percent of 
employers indicated that their primary reason for conducting credit background checks is 
to reduce liability for negligent hiring). 
146 See Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 609–10 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (discussing the torts of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 317 (1965) (discussing the negligent hiring theory). 
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on incorrect assumptions about debtor behavior, but also to protect 
employers from the perceived necessity of reviewing information that, 
in spite of its tenuous connection to an employee’s merits, is commonly 
perceived as indispensable to a thorough risk-mitigation review.147 
d. Licensing Organizations Qua Creditors 
 Some licensing organizations that consult the credit histories of 
licensing applicants are not necessarily using them to assess the candi-
date’s capacity to be responsible or his or her propensity to commit 
theft. Rather, some licensing organizations’ evaluative role is more 
analogous to that of (1) a creditor assessing a prospective borrower’s 
financial standing, or of (2) state or federal regulators seeking to en-
sure that the banks they charter can meet safety and soundness re-
quirements.148 
 For example, some states require prospective contractors, as a 
condition to the award of a contractor’s license, to submit personal 
credit reports to licensing bodies.149 The objective of this financial as-
sessment is to ensure that the contractor will be able to secure neces-
sary contract bonds, obtain necessary financing for construction or in-
stallation projects, and pay all subcontractors.150 In addition, some 
medical board examiners may consult applicants’ credit reports to en-
sure that applicants will be able to secure liability insurance.151 
 Licensing organizations have a broader mandate than do employ-
ers. They can regulate certain professions to ensure the public’s health, 
                                                                                                                      
147 See infra notes 411–413 and accompanying text. 
148 For example, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency must certify that it has 
considered the following factors in deciding whether to approve an application for a na-
tional bank charter: (1) the financial history and condition of the bank, (2) the adequacy 
of its capital structure, (3) the bank’s future earnings prospects, (4) the general character 
and fitness of its management, (5) the risk presented by the bank, (6) the convenience 
and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and (7) whether or not the bank 
has complied with all provisions of the National Bank Act and whether or not its corporate 
powers are consistent with the purposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1816 (2006). 
149 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 489.115(5)(b) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring an applicant 
for a contracting certificate to submit a credit report “that reflects the financial responsibility 
of the applicant and evidence of financial responsibility, credit, and business reputation of 
either himself or herself or the business organization he or she desires to qualify”). 
150 See id. (“The board shall adopt rules defining financial responsibility based upon 
the applicant’s credit history, ability to be bonded, and any history of bankruptcy or as-
signment of receivers.”). 
151 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-64-301 (2011) (requiring, as a condition of licensure, that 
every physician or dentist establish financial responsibility, which requires maintaining 
commercial professional liability insurance coverage). 
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safety, and welfare.152 As a result, it may be reasonable for licensing 
bodies to scrutinize applicants’ financial histories—not to make predic-
tions about an applicant’s conscientiousness or likelihood of commit-
ting fraud or theft, but to ensure that the prospective licensee will sat-
isfy the financial prerequisites necessary for him or her to succeed in 
the venture. In such cases, because the licensing organization is not 
primarily using an applicant’s financial history to make substantive as-
sessments about the applicant’s non-credit behaviors, this use of finan-
cial histories may not necessarily directly implicate the antidiscrimina-
tion questions considered in this Article.153 
                                                                                                                     
II. Justifications for and Against Expansion of a Financial 
History Antidiscrimination Norm 
 Social science has played a significant role in helping shape legal 
policy, and it will continue to play a meaningful role in determining the 
proper scope of employers’ and licensing organizations’ right to con-
sult applicants’ financial histories. The task of antidiscrimination law, 
however, is to balance empirical realities—including their known and 
unknown limitations—with various other factors, including the role 
employment practices have on systematically disadvantaged popula-
tions. In this Part, I consider to what extent an expanded financial his-
tory antidiscrimination norm affects other social goals, including the 
promotion of debt repayment, racial equality, and social mobility.154 I 
also consider to what extent the findings of behavioral economists sug-
gest that the underlying traits reflected in financial histories may be 
more immutable than neoclassical theorists have been willing to con-
cede, thereby rendering individuals with adverse financial histories 
more deserving of antidiscrimination protection.155 
A. Discrimination as Deterrence: Promoting Debt Repayment 
 As Professor Anna Kirkland has explained, the distinctions that 
employers make between employees are often justified by reference to 
 
152 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 489.101 (West 2006) (“The Legislature deems it neces-
sary in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare to regulate the construction 
industry.”). 
153 There may exist, however, a false dichotomy between business and consumer finan-
cial ventures. For example, many individuals file for bankruptcy after their small busi-
nesses fail. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Busi-
nesses in Bankruptcy, 73 Am. Bankr. L.J. 499, 535 (1999). 
154 See infra notes 156–246 and accompanying text. 
155 See infra notes 247–279 and accompanying text. 
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a goal of deterrence.156 Employers may differentiate among applicants 
to promote certain traits and behaviors perceived as beneficial to the 
organization and to the surrounding community.157 Many employers 
and licensing organizations that scrutinize applicants’ financial histo-
ries may choose not to hire applicants who have filed for bankruptcy or 
who have defaulted on a certain type of financial obligation, because 
this is conduct that they or others may view as harmful or reprehensi-
ble.158 Employers’ and licensing organizations’ use of financial histories 
thus functions as an extralegal deterrent to debt default—a sanction 
that can serve to supplement and enhance existing legal penalties.159 
 One may point to several examples of how employers’ and licens-
ing organizations’ use of financial histories directly encourages and en-
forces debt repayment. In the legal profession, for example, state bar 
examiners conduct “character and fitness” assessments of law school 
graduates to determine whether applicants are sufficiently ethical to 
serve the public as attorneys.160 As part of this inquiry, some bar exam-
iners evaluate applicants’ credit reports, income tax returns, past-due 
debts, and litigation histories.161 A candidate’s failure to demonstrate a 
sufficient level of financial responsibility may bar her from joining the 
legal profession.162 In preparation for the character and fitness review, 
                                                                                                                      
156 Kirkland, supra note 15, at 10. 
157 Id. (discussing the role of deterrence in the context of employing overweight peo-
ple and explaining, “[i]f fatness is unhealthy and comes from eating too much, then it is 
behavior that could be deterred and we would all be better off”). 
158 See infra notes 160–163, 173–180 and accompanying text (discussing licensing or-
ganizations’ consideration of familial support obligation, tax, and student loan defaults). 
159 See Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social 
Norms, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 367, 367–68 (2002) (arguing that normative behavioral stan-
dards are superior to legal regulation). 
160 See Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character Require-
ment for Bar Admission, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 67, 92–96 (1984) (discussing the role of 
financial malfeasance on admission to the bar and arguing that courts and bar admission 
boards should be wary of denying admission on that basis). 
161 E.g., Ill. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, supra note 80 (explain-
ing that a character investigation will be conducted with information received from employers, 
former employers, colleges and universities, law schools, other bar admitting authorities, 
courts, law enforcement agencies, creditors, credit reporting agencies, former spouses, and 
character references); Bar Examination Instructions, W. Va. Judiciary, Board of L. Examiners, 
http://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/Bd-of-Law/exam-instructions.html (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012) (requiring applicants to submit a current credit report); Utah State Bar Admis-
sions-Frequently Asked Questions, Office of Bar Admissions, http://www.utahbar.org/admis- 
sions/admissions_faq.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (“As part of the background investigation 
the Utah State Bar will obtain a credit report for every Applicant.”); Va. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 
supra note 80, at 10 (requiring applicants to the Virginia bar to submit a current credit report 
and driving record with all Character & Fitness Questionnaires). 
162 See, e.g., In re Application of Griffin, 943 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ohio 2011) (per curiam). 
1724 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1695 
law students have thus been encouraged to live frugally, to set up pay-
ment plans with creditors, and generally to “rehabilitate” their financial 
images as early as possible.163 
 Employers’ debt-enforcement function is also manifested in those 
facts and circumstances that employers view as mitigating factors in as-
sessing various flaws in applicants’ financial histories. For example, in 
scrutinizing candidates’ financial backgrounds, some employers claim 
to give some applicants an opportunity to explain or justify bankruptcy 
filings or collection actions that appear on applicants’ reports.164 If an 
applicant who has been the subject of one or more collection actions 
reports that he or she has instituted repayment plans with these credi-
tors, the applicant’s defaults are more likely to be pardoned.165 These 
repayment attempts are more likely to be interpreted as acts of concilia-
tion. If the applicant has attempted to redeem him or herself, some 
employers claim that the applicant’s default is more likely to be for-
given. 
 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the federal statute that 
governs employers’ use of credit reports, institutionalizes employers’ 
debt-enforcement function by allowing employers—like creditors—to 
scrutinize applicants’ financial histories.166 Employers, like creditors, 
are described as “permissible users” of consumer reports.167 Signifi-
cantly, the statute requires employers to share with applicants disclo-
sure notices that serve as “teachable moments” for consumers.168 Un-
der the FCRA, an employer who intends to deny employment to an 
applicant based in whole or in part on information in a credit report 
must first disclose that fact to the applicant in a pre-adverse action no-
tice that includes a copy of the credit report.169 The goal of the adverse 
action requirement is to provide job candidates with an opportunity to 
correct any consequential errors in the report, but it also has a strong 
                                                                                                                      
163 Shaw, supra note 105, at 14. 
164 Bill Roberts, Close-Up on Screening: Use of Criminal Records and Credit Histories in Hiring 
Decisions Is Coming Squarely Under the Legislative and Policy-Making Microscope, HR Mag., Feb. 
2011, at 23, 26 (“Most [employers] discuss unfavorable reports with candidates to check 
accuracy and understand the context . . . .”). 
165 See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Meeting of Oct. 20, 2010—Employer Use 
of Credit History as a Screening Tool, Transcript of Meeting at 32 [hereinafter EEOC, Oct. 
20 Meeting Tr.] (Devata), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/transcript.cfm 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (“If applicants are attempting to repay debt, that’s a positive.”). 
166 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006). 
167 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(c) (incorporating § 1681b(a)(3)(B)). 
168 See Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 8.5.1.1 (explaining that “teachable mo-
ments” are those that might prompt consumers to improve their credit history). 
169 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). 
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deterrent effect.170 The statute, in effect, mandates that employers di-
rectly associate in an applicant’s mind a potential job rejection and his 
or her financial transgression. 
 Supporters of employers’ use of financial histories might contend 
that the practice serves a salutary economic function. Frequently, the 
costs of default are borne by society as a whole, externalized in the form 
of increased interest rates, a decreased availability of credit, and higher 
prices for consumer products and services.171 Because default is an in-
fraction against the community, it is arguably economically and socially 
beneficial for employers to help enforce debts indirectly by serving, in 
effect, as creditors’ proxies. In the distribution of a critical resource like 
a job, one might argue that employers thus have every right to reward 
those who live within their means. Job applicants have an incentive to 
comply with such a nonlegal sanction, since doing so enhances their 
attractiveness to employers.172 
 One might argue that employers can exercise their debt-
enforcement functions in a nuanced way, thereby mitigating the poten-
tially harsh consequences of a strict application of the rule. Presumably, 
employers can be logical, reasoned, and empathetic in their considera-
tion of applicants’ financial backgrounds. Employers can also scrutinize 
financial histories in a way that advances specific normative goals. In 
assessing a particular debt default, some employers and licensing or-
ganizations consider specific factors, including (1) the apparent muta-
bility or immutability of the consumer’s predicament, (2) the degree of 
leverage a creditor can assert in debt collection, and (3) other social 
values.173 
 In assessing the immutability of the consumer’s default, debt load, 
or bankruptcy filing, a creditor may consider to what extent the con-
sumer was capable of avoiding the status or situation that triggered her 
adverse financial situation. Some employers, for example, claim to dis-
                                                                                                                      
170 See Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 8.5.1.1 (“If any of the information about the 
consumer is inaccurate or misleading, the consumer may try to reverse the adverse action 
by correcting or explaining the third party information.”). 
171 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 36, at 1484 (explaining that rational choice 
economists argue that lenders in competitive credit markets cannot pass on the costs of 
default and bankruptcy to high-risk borrowers, a problem that triggers either credit ration-
ing or an increase in the cost of credit). 
172 Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of 
Norms as Private Regulation, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 19 (2005) (“The general model of rational 
norm formation describes individuals as being attracted to one another because they asso-
ciate positive outcomes with those with whom they cooperate.”). 
173 See infra notes 174–180 and accompanying text. 
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regard any defaults on medical debt.174 These breaches may be consid-
ered less objectionable, since consumers cannot necessarily easily avoid 
the health problems that trigger their need to borrow money to pay for 
medical expenses. Employers may also take a more forgiving view of 
financial problems triggered by divorces, separations, and job layoffs— 
circumstances that employers are less likely to associate with irresponsi-
bility and profligacy.175 
 An employer may likewise consider a creditor’s leverage over a 
particular debtor. If a creditor is perceived to be more powerless in col-
lecting a particular debt, an employer (or, more likely, bar examiner or 
other member of a professional licensing organization) may be more 
sympathetic toward the creditor and thus more inclined to enforce the 
obligation indirectly by scrutinizing an applicant’s financial history. For 
example, a debtor’s default on a student loan may be considered par-
ticularly problematic because student loans are very large unsecured 
debt obligations. A student does not pledge any collateral to secure her 
repayment of a loan used to pay for tuition. One may argue that, with-
out a strong debt repayment norm, defaults would increase.176 
 Finally, an employer or licensing organization might consider oth-
er social values that affect the relative status of a particular debt.177 For 
example, many professional licensing organizations appear to regard 
certain debts—like income taxes178 and familial support obliga-
tions179—as sacrosanct. This perspective reflects the favored or privi-
                                                                                                                      
174 Legislative Position, Md. Chamber of Commerce, SB 132, Job Fairness Act 1 (Feb. 2, 
2011), http://www.mdchamber.org/legislative/bills/pdfs/SB132.pdf (explaining that most 
employers disregard information about medical bills). 
175 EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Tr., supra note 165, at 32 (Devata). 
176 See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hard-
ship Discharge Litigation, 83 Am. Bankr. L.J. 179, 180–81 (2009) (explaining that in 1976, 
Congress, based on evidence of perceived abuses, amended the bankruptcy laws to make 
student loans dischargeable in only limited circumstances). In effect, however, lenders’ 
leverage over student borrowers is significant, since, among other things, student loans are 
generally nondischargeable in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8)(A)–(B) (2006), and tax 
refunds may be intercepted to pay defaulted federal loans, 31 U.S.C. § 3720A (2006). 
177 These normative judgments about the relative merits of particular debts may loose-
ly parallel those reflected in the rules by which the Bankruptcy Code distributes limited 
assets to a debtor’s creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)–(10) (listing the relative priorities 
of specific creditor claims). 
178 Press Release, Iowa Bd. of Med. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://medicalboard.iowa.gov/ 
Press/2011/04_19_2011.pdf (suspending the medical license of an Iowa physician who 
had defaulted on his taxes). 
179 Child Support Enforcement Mandate, Md. Board Physicians, http://www.mbp.state. 
md.us/pages/child_support.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (explaining that the Maryland 
Board of Physicians is required to suspend the license of any licensee or to deny a license 
to any applicant who has defaulted on child support obligations). 
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leged status of particular creditors. Familial support claimants are pro-
vided with more protection because of the “social primacy of family 
welfare” and because these claimants are “unable effectively to pass on 
the loss.”180 Tax obligations enjoy a privileged status because state and 
local governments have significant leverage in debt collection. 
 It is critical, however, to assess whether—and to what extent— em-
ployers’ and others’ use of financial histories actually promotes debt 
repayment.181 That is not an easy question to answer. Some may argue 
that employers’ use of financial histories, in penalizing applicants who 
have defaulted on their debts, encourages debtors to work harder to 
reconcile with their creditors. For example, it is possible that Congress’s 
inclusion of an antidiscrimination provision in the Bankruptcy Code 
contributed to the relaxation of the “stigma” consumers attach to bank-
ruptcy filings.182 The relaxation of the bankruptcy stigma, some ar-
gued, in turn resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of bank-
ruptcy filings between the 1970s and early 2000s.183 Thus, many might 
contend that the ability of employers to discriminate against debtors 
enhances debt repayment by discouraging debt default. 
                                                                                                                     
 It is possible, however, that the practice may have the opposite ef-
fect. A debtor who faces too great of a burden to repay his or her credi-
tors may have an incentive to work less and to consume more leisure— 
an item that a creditor cannot attach, and that an employer cannot 
pressure the employee to repay.184 Employers’ and licensing organiza-
tions’ consideration of financial histories may thus create incentives for 
 
180 Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 
1047, 1057 (1987). 
181 See Geisinger, supra note 172, at 26 (arguing that “optimism regarding norm effi-
ciency is greatly exaggerated”). 
182 See, e.g., Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 Emory 
Bankr. Dev. J. 481, 496–97 (2006); Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer 
Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1933, 1946–49 (2011) (describing the debate about whether a reduction in the bankruptcy 
“stigma” contributed to a historic and dramatic increase in the number of bankruptcy filers). 
183 Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 62 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 1071, 1108 (2005) (explaining that several changes made in the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code, including the adoption of § 525 (the antidiscrimination provision), may have 
triggered “[a] change in social norms regarding bankruptcy”). Significantly, however, the 
Bankruptcy Code’s antidiscrimination provision is extremely weak, belying the notion that 
it contributed to a relaxation of the bankruptcy stigma. See infra notes 325–380 and ac-
companying text. 
184 See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 
1393, 1420 (1985) (explaining that forcing individuals to pay debts out of future income 
can have perverse effects by encouraging individuals to pursue leisure instead of produc-
tive activity). 
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applicants to reduce their productivity levels, which can trigger exter-
nalities borne by taxpayers, dependents, and others.185 
 Commentators have made similar arguments in analyzing coercive 
creditor remedies (like garnishment) and the bankruptcy discharge. 
Because excessive garnishment and strict restrictions on access to bank-
ruptcy may decrease debtors’ productivity, at least one commentator 
has argued that restricting garnishment and preserving debtors’ access 
to a nonwaivable bankruptcy discharge may have a salutary economic 
effect.186 Similarly, reducing employers’ ability to enforce debts strictly 
through an antidiscrimination rule may actually increase economic 
productivity.187 
 The most compelling argument against the debt-enforcement ra-
tionale is that it conflicts with the “functional individualist” framework 
that dominates employment law.188 Pursuant to this normative frame-
work, employees should be judged by their ability to perform their jobs, 
and not by any other metrics.189 Employers’ implicit focus on debt en-
forcement seemingly expands and redefines the requirements of a giv-
en position, requiring prospective employees to shape their behavior in 
a way that, in most cases, appears to do little to enhance or improve 
their job skills. A good credit history is arguably unrelated to one’s abil-
                                                                                                                      
185 Cf. id. at 1418–24 (describing the externalities that would result from imposing lim-
itations on the right to discharge personal debts in bankruptcy). 
186 Id. at 1424. 
187 The argument that discrimination against debtors by employers may reduce eco-
nomic productivity does not by itself, however, justify a complete prohibition on employer 
discrimination. Rather, it suggests that limitations on indirect debt enforcement by em-
ployers (through discrimination) may be necessary to reduce the risk that externalities will 
result. In the context of creditor remedies, 
[o]ne might argue . . . that coercive remedies will exacerbate the externality 
problem if the effect of enforcing the remedy (such as wage garnishment) is 
to cause debtors to quit their jobs. This might occur if the difference between 
the level of public welfare benefits and the allowable exemption from gar-
nishment were so small that it was not worth it for debtors to work for the dif-
ference. This point, however, does not argue for prohibiting wage assign-
ments altogether. Rather, it implies that wage exemptions must be set 
sufficiently above the relevant welfare entitlements so that a significant incen-
tive to work remains. 
Cf. Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
730, 772 n.139 (1989). 
188 See Kirkland, supra note 15, at 7. 
189 Id. 
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ity to wait on customers, to drive a taxi, or to practice law.190 A rationale 
concerned with debt enforcement seems tangential to the discrete goal 
of producing stronger, more qualified applicants. Placing pressure on 
job applicants to present a healthy financial image requires them to 
reallocate a portion of their time and resources to ends that do not 
produce a more efficient, more educated, or more skilled employee. In 
this way, allowing employers and licensing organizations to consider 
financial histories may ultimately impede—not enhance—the norma-
tive goal of promoting debt repayment. 
B. Curtailing Racial Inequality 
 Financial viability and independence require access to credit as 
well as affordable loan terms. Throughout much of U.S. history, how-
ever, many racial and ethnic minorities have been denied one or both 
of these critical components of a healthy, stable financial life. Depend-
ing upon market forces, social pressures, and applicable laws, lending 
practices have often operated, for reasons frequently unrelated to cred-
itworthiness, either to deny credit to minorities,191 or to grant credit to 
minorities on more unfavorable terms.192 
 In light of the importance of access to credit to basic functioning in 
society, the law prohibits creditors from discriminating against racial and 
ethnic minorities and other protected groups. Based on evidence that 
various groups—particularly women—had long faced difficulty access-
ing credit,193 in 1974 Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA).194 The ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating against 
applicants on the basis of sex, marital status, race, color, religion, na-
                                                                                                                      
190 But see supra notes 116–136 (describing claims that credit reports are valid measures 
of traits like conscientiousness. I collectively refer to such claims as the “Responsibility 
Hypothesis”). 
191 Pridgen & Alderman, supra note 52, § 3:10 (describing how minorities have been 
denied mortgages at a rate higher than that of similarly situated non-minority applicants). 
192 For example, in the years preceding the subprime mortgage crisis, minorities re-
ceived mortgages that were more likely to end up in default. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Coun-
trywide Will Settle a Bias Suit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2011, at B1. In December 2011, the U.S. 
Department of Justice settled a discrimination suit against Countrywide, a mortgage lender 
that charged higher fees and interest rates to minority borrowers than to white borrowers 
who posed the same credit risk. Id. Countrywide also steered minority borrowers into cost-
ly subprime mortgages when white borrowers with similar credit profiles received regular 
loans. Id. 
193 Nat’l Comm’n on Consumer Fin., Consumer Credit in the United States 152–
53 (1972). 
194 Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 
et seq. (2006)). 
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tional origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, or the good-faith 
exercise of any right under other consumer credit protection laws.195 
The ECOA’s success rate has been mixed, primarily because of the chal-
lenges plaintiffs face in proving discrimination.196 Nonetheless, in pass-
ing the ECOA, Congress has recognized both (1) how indispensable 
access to credit is in modern America, and (2) how creditors’ considera-
tion of impermissible criteria can serve to financially disenfranchise a 
large segment of the American population. 
 Access to a job is even more important to one’s financial welfare 
than is access to mortgages and other loans, since a steady income is 
required to fulfill one’s basic needs and is a prerequisite to access to 
credit. Because of a strong correlation between race and credit score,197 
employers’ use of financial histories in the employment setting has thus 
triggered a problem similar to the one addressed by Congress in the 
ECOA. Although creditors under the ECOA are barred from discrimi-
nating against individuals because of race and other factors, employers 
and licensing organizations—who control access to jobs—are generally 
authorized to consider credit reports—directly correlated with race—in 
the licensing and employment process.198 
 Various studies on credit scores have revealed stark disparities be-
tween minorities and non-minorities. A 2000 study by Freddie Mac, for 
example, revealed a strong correlation between race and credit 
score.199 A 2007 study by the Federal Reserve Board found that blacks 
and Hispanics have lower credit scores than do non-Hispanic whites 
and Asians.200 Likewise, a 2006 Brookings Institute study showed that 
the higher the concentration of racial or ethnic minorities in a county, 
the more likely the county’s average credit score will be low.201 The 
                                                                                                                      
195 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). 
196 Pridgen & Alderman, supra note 52, §§ 3.1, 3.7. 
197 See infra notes 199–206 and accompanying text. 
198 Applicants, however, may sue under the ECOA if facially neutral creditor practices 
had a disparate impact on one or more protected groups. See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 
F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that ECOA plaintiffs may seek relief under 
the “effects test”). Although employers do not use credit scores, there is good reason to 
believe that employers’ use of the raw data in credit reports has a disparate impact on mi-
norities. See supra note 112. 
199 See EEOC, May 16 Hearing Record, supra note 109 (statement of Adam T. Klein) (cit-
ing the 2000 Freddie Mac National Consumer Credit Survey). 
200 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress on Credit 
Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit 80–81 (2007), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore. 
pdf. 
201 Fellowes, supra note 1, at 9. 
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Brookings Institute study does not suggest that racial differences be-
tween counties cause these differences in scores, nor does it not control 
for important variables—including income—that may contribute to the 
association between race and credit score.202 Rather, this correlation 
more broadly reflects the many historical disparities between whites 
and minorities in access to high-quality education, well-paying jobs, and 
affordable loans.203 Disparities in income and education may also affect 
consumers’ ability to understand and compare loan terms.204 Addition-
ally, the large gap in scores may be attributable to credit bureaus’ his-
toric failure to incorporate in their credit scoring algorithms nontradi-
tional sources of credit history information—including payday loan 
histories, utility payments, and rental payments.205 Although the Brook-
ings Institute study did not control for income, other studies that have 
done so have identified race as the single most robust predictor of cred-
it scores.206 
 The racial impact of employers’ use of financial histories may be 
partially ameliorated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under 
Title VII, employers’ use of credit history—a seemingly neutral prac-
tice—is prohibited if the practice has a disparate impact on a protected 
group.207 As the Supreme Court explained in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Pow-
er Co., seemingly neutral practices are discriminatory “if they operate to 
‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”208 
 The EEOC has long recognized that employers’ use of credit re-
ports can have a disparate impact on minority applicants. Beginning in 
the 1970s, the EEOC issued several decisions finding that employers 
violated Title VII by using credit reports as tools in the employee-
screening process.209 In a 1971 case, a bank chose not to hire an Afri-
                                                                                                                      
202 See id. at 9–10, 18 n.31. 
203 Id. at 10. 
204 Id. 
205 Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 14.9.1 (6th ed. 2006). In recent years, however, 
more creditors have begun including nontraditional sources of credit information in al-
ternative credit scoring models. See, e.g., Lenders Across Industries Validate FICO Expansion 
Score’s Power, FICO (Feb. 2012), http://www.fico.com/en/FIResourcesLibrary/Lenders_ 
Success_2249CS.pdf. 
206 See, e.g., Brent Kabler, Mo. Dep’t. of Ins., Insurance-Based Credit Scores: Im-
pact on Minority and Low Income Populations in Missouri 1–2 (2004), http://in- 
surance.mo.gov/reports/credscore.pdf. 
207 Title VII describes as “an unlawful employment practice” an employer’s (1) failure 
or refusal to hire, or (2) discharge of any individual with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
208 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
209 Concepción, supra note 17, at 533. 
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can American male as a computer operator “in part because of a rela-
tively poor credit record.”210 More recently, the EEOC filed a lawsuit 
against Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, claiming that the com-
pany’s use of credit histories in the hiring process had a disparate im-
pact on African Americans.211 
215 
                                                                                                                     
 Under Title VII, proof of a disparate impact on a protected group 
is insufficient to enjoin the challenged practice or procedure.212 An 
employer may continue its challenged practice if the employer can es-
tablish that the practice is job-related and consistent with business ne-
cessity.213 To utilize this defense successfully, the employer must show 
that the challenged practice relates to an important business need or to 
the employee’s ability to do the job.214 Even if the employer satisfies 
this burden, liability can still be imposed if the plaintiff can establish 
the existence of a less discriminatory alternative.
 Employers have successfully persuaded courts that the use of credit 
reports in employment may be necessary if employees have access to 
cash—a use of the business necessity defense that rests heavily on the 
largely unsupported Fraud Hypothesis.216 In EEOC v. United Virginia 
Bank, decided in 1977, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia concluded that a bank was justified in conducting pre-
employment credit checks, since “the banking business is a fiduciary 
business . . . where there is a good deal of cash openly handled.”217 In 
Bailey v. DeBard, a 1975 case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana ruled that it was appropriate for the Indiana State 
Police Department to make hiring decisions based on character investi-
gations that included a review of credit histories.218 The court con-
cluded that such a review was relevant to a police officer’s job perform-
ance because an adverse financial status might trigger a greater 
 
210 EEOC Decision No. 72-427, 1971 WL 3943, at *1 (Aug. 31, 1971). 
211 Complaint at 2–3, EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-02882-PAG, 2010 
WL 5157837 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2010). 
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (codifying the disparate impact theory articulated 
in Griggs); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430–32. 
213 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“The touch-
stone is business necessity.”). 
214 Charles A. Sullivan & Lauren M. Walter, Employment Discrimination Law 
and Practice § 4.01 (2009); see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587–88 (2009); Griggs, 
401 U.S. at 431. 
215 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
216 See supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. 
217 No. 75-166-N, 1977 WL 15340, at *15 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 1977). 
218 No. IP 74-458-C, 1975 WL 227, at *17 (S.D. Ind. July 31, 1975). 
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attraction to “the criminal element.”219 Even those states that have re-
cently passed laws limiting employers’ use of credit reports have codified 
as business necessities the use of financial histories to vet applicants for 
positions involving access to money, the exercise of fiduciary responsi-
bilities, or access to confidential information.220 
                                                                                                                     
 For these and other reasons, Title VII has failed to fully protect 
individuals from the discriminatory effects of the use of credit reports 
in hiring. Although courts generally recognize that employers’ use of 
financial histories may be challenged on a disparate impact theory, rel-
atively few courts have dealt directly with such actions.221 The relative 
rarity of Title VII claims may be attributable to the fact that applicants 
may be rejected for undisclosed reasons.222 Specifically, it is unclear to 
what extent employers comply with a requirement under the FCRA that 
they notify applicants if credit reports played a role in the employers’ 
decision not to hire the applicant.223 In other words, it is possible that 
employers use credit reports as a factor in the hiring process, but fail to 
so acknowledge, thereby making it harder for plaintiffs to prove that 
the use of credit reports resulted in discrimination. 
 The inadequacies of Title VII claims highlight the need for a 
stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm to protect the inter-
ests of traditionally disadvantaged groups, including racial minorities. 
The currently very competitive marketplace has triggered a game of 
“musical chairs” whereby workers must compete with others for a lim-
ited number of positions. It is critical to ensure that limited social goods 
like jobs are not reallocated pursuant to criteria shown to perpetuate 
inequality and to be tenuously related to job performance. 
 
219 Id. 
220 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
221 Donna M. Malin, Use of Credit History in Employment Decisions, Nat’l Conference on Equal 
Emp’t Opportunity Law (Mar. 2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin- 
istrative/labor_law/meetings/2008/2008_eeo_malin.authcheckdam.pdf. Although no federal 
court has held that pre-employment credit checks have a disparate impact on racial minorities, 
some have held that the use of general background investigations that include inquiries into 
the applicant’s financial history does violate Title VII. Concepción, supra note 17, at 534–35 
(citing United States v. City of Chi., 549 F.2d 415, 432 (7th Cir. 1977); Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. 
Supp. 836, 851–52 (S.D. Ohio 1975)). 
222 EEOC, May 16 Hearing Record, supra note 109 (statement of Adam T. Klein) (“[A]n 
applicant rejected for having an insufficiently positive credit record typically will not know 
that a never-disclosed employer credit-history check is the reason.”). 
223 See infra notes 287–295 and accompanying text (discussing the adverse action no-
tice requirements imposed by the FCRA). 
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C. Promoting Social Mobility and Financial Recovery 
 Closely related to the concern that employers’ and licensing or-
ganizations’ use of financial histories can perpetuate racial inequality is 
the risk that the practice poses an affront to social mobility. Employers’ 
and licensing organizations’ consideration of financial histories, as I 
discuss below, may impact social mobility in three general ways.224 First, 
the practice may impact the distribution of particular jobs among indi-
viduals of lower socioeconomic backgrounds.225 Second, it may place 
downward pressure on these individuals’ wages.226 Third, the practice 
may represent a more symbolic affront to social mobility by signaling to 
consumers that the effects of their financial decisions have serious col-
lateral consequences—ones that extend beyond the realm of access to 
and cost of credit.227 
1. The Effects of Credit History on Socioeconomic Status 
 Employers’ use of financial histories in the hiring process may have 
a disproportionate impact on individuals of a lower socioeconomic sta-
tus, since there exists a correlation (albeit imperfect) between income 
and credit history.228 Thus, employers who use credit reports as a selec-
tion tool may be adversely impacting poorer individuals’ ability to as-
cend to positions of greater status and wealth. Although credit reports 
are commonly used in filling low-level retail positions,229 they are also 
frequently used to help fill management roles, including, for example, 
                                                                                                                      
224 See infra notes 228–246 and accompanying text. 
225 See infra notes 228–233 and accompanying text. 
226 See infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
227 See infra notes 235–246 and accompanying text. 
228 Fumiko Hayashi & Joanna Stavins, Effects of Credit Scores on Consumer Payment Choice 
13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Discussion Paper No. 12-1, 2012), available at http:// 
www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdp1201.pdf (“Demographic characteristics are 
highly correlated with credit score even after controlling for financial difficulty variables 
and card status. Older consumers and higher-income earners tend to have a higher credit 
score.”). But cf. Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Melt-
down, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1257, 1271 (2009) (“Credit scores do not exactly correlate with 
income, in that high-income borrowers may have low credit scores, and vice versa, depend-
ing on their payment histories.”). 
229 See, e.g., Credit Builders Alliance, Credit Builders Toolkit, Employers and Credit Fact 
Sheet 1 (n.d.), http://www.creditbuildersalliance.org/files/employers_and_credit_fact_sheet. 
pdf (“According to the 2003 National Retail Security Survey, conducted by the University of 
Florida, 41% of retailers used pre-screening credit checks, with another 10% of retailers are 
[sic] planning to start.”). 
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CEO and CFO positions.230 In hiring faculty members and administra-
tors, some universities consult candidates’ credit reports.231 Even several 
state laws that limit employers’ uses of credit reports nonetheless author-
ize employers to use credit reports to fill certain leadership or manage-
ment roles.232 These are all positions of consequence—ones that reward 
successful applicants with meaningful remunerative or symbolic bene-
fits. Thus, to the extent that poorer applicants may have worse financial 
histories, they may be penalized in the assessment process. The practice 
may also deter poorer applicants from applying for such positions, 
thereby reducing the representation of individuals of a lower socioeco-
nomic status in the management ranks. 
 Employers might argue that even if their use of financial histories 
reduces social mobility, its independent effect may not be quantitatively 
significant. It seems likely that other factors—including access to educa-
tion and race—play a more substantial role in impacting, both over 
time and at the application stage, which candidates receive which posi-
tions. Although the poor ineluctably face greater challenges in ascend-
ing to more prestigious or more highly compensated positions,233 it 
seems probable that this impact takes place gradually. In other words, 
employers’ and licensing organizations’ consideration of financial his-
tories may pose only a marginal or incremental barrier to upward social 
mobility. While this would not be a reason to enjoin antidiscrimination 
efforts, it might reduce the relative urgency of promoting antidiscrimi-
nation reform. 
2. Suppression of Wages 
 Even if employers’ use of financial histories has a de minimis inde-
pendent effect on the distribution of specific jobs, the practice may 
more generally and insidiously impair social mobility by suppressing 
                                                                                                                      
230 See Background Checking, supra note 60, at 5 (reporting that forty-six percent of 
employers surveyed conducted background checks to evaluate job candidates for senior 
executive positions). 
231 See David Evans, Criminal-Background Checks, Chron. Higher Educ. (May 28, 2008, 
1:42 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/onhiring/criminal-background-checks/570. 
232 See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-711 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (authoriz-
ing employers to use credit reports to fill a position that “is managerial and involves setting 
the direction or control of a business, or a department, division, unit, or agency of a busi-
ness”). 
233 See Garth L. Mangum et al., The Persistence of Poverty in the United 
States 14 (2003) (discussing how children who grow up in poverty experience adverse 
long-term consequences in academic achievement, educational attainment, health, crimi-
nal justice behavior, and social behavior long into their adult lives). 
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the wages of those with adverse financial histories.234 Employers recog-
nize that applicants with poor financial histories may be more likely to 
accept lower salaries, since these individuals (1) suffer a competitive 
disadvantage in the application process, and (2) depending on their 
specific financial circumstances, may more urgently require a steady 
income source. As a result, job applicants with adverse financial histo-
ries—regardless of their precise socioeconomic status—may find it 
more difficult to recover from financial upheaval. 
3. Symbolic Affront to Social Mobility 
 It is also possible that the practice’s most direct affront to social 
mobility stems from its deterrent and symbolic role, suggesting that the 
goals of debt repayment and social mobility are in tension with one an-
other.235 Philosopher Michael Walzer’s description of “complex equal-
ity” illustrates how the use of credit scores—correlated heavily with 
wealth236 and race237—poses a philosophical challenge to equality and 
fairness.238 Walzer contends that in a society, “[n]o social good x should 
be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y 
merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of 
x.”239 Walzer describes social goods as membership, security and wel-
fare, money and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, 
kinship and love, divine grace, recognition, and political power.240 
Thus, to facilitate complex equality, it would be unjust to allocate a so-
cial good like a job or membership in a particular profession based up-
on individuals’ possession of positive financial histories—which are 
heavily correlated with income and race. 
 To prospective job applicants, the use of financial histories is 
densely symbolic. A credit report—designed specifically by and for 
creditors—has been transplanted to numerous noncredit settings, rais-
ing concerns—particularly during a weak economy—that the effects of 
calamity and financial distress are being unfairly and unnecessarily 
                                                                                                                      
234 See Hayashi & Stavins, supra note 228, at 13 (discussing how higher-income indi-
viduals tend to have higher credit scores). 
235 See supra notes 156–190 and accompanying text; infra notes 236–246 and accompa-
nying text. 
236 Hayashi & Stavins, supra note 228, at 13. 
237 See supra notes 191–223 and accompanying text. 
238 See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 
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240 See generally id. (dedicating a chapter to each of these social goods). 
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compounded. Applicants may perceive this practice to “kick them when 
they’re down,” thereby perpetuating income inequality and slowing 
down financial rehabilitation following a financial shock. To a job ap-
plicant, the consequences of financial lapses are seemingly amplified, 
having consequences above and beyond their immediate “sphere.”241 
 The practice may be perceived not only to compound financial 
misfortune, but also to penalize lower- and middle-class consumers for 
unsuccessful entrepreneurial and other ventures. When an employer or 
licensing organization reviews an applicant’s credit history, that em-
ployer or licensing organization is retrospectively and bluntly assessing 
the risk-taking that is sometimes required to improve one’s life stand-
ing. Particularly during periods of high unemployment, individuals 
with dim job prospects make consequential entrepreneurial wagers in 
their lives—including, for example, starting small businesses242 or as-
suming significant educational debt.243 A sizeable proportion of these 
bets will fail.244 If employers and licensing organizations can consider 
financial history in the hiring process, the consequences of these past 
entrepreneurial wagers become broader and more enduring than an 
individual could likely have predicted at the moment he or she origi-
nally assumed the financial risk. 
 Employers’ consideration of financial histories may serve to mag-
nify and compound the effects of financial decisions and events, making 
it more difficult for individuals to escape the effects of bankruptcies, 
collection actions, and other adverse financial circumstances. Without 
the application of a robust financial antidiscrimination norm, the prom-
ise of social mobility—an American ethos—is undermined. At least one 
commentator has suggested that social mobility is overrated as a policy 
                                                                                                                      
241 See id. at 20. 
242 See Laura Petrecca, Recession, Layoffs Fuel Many to Start Small Businesses, USA Today, 
(Sept. 18, 2009, 12:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/smallbusiness/startup/week1-
exploring-small-business-options.htm (describing that approximately ten percent of job-
seekers who gained employment during one recessionary period did so by launching their 
own businesses, and describing that the failure rate for small businesses is exceptionally high 
even during non-recessionary periods); see also A. Roy Thurik et al., Does Self-Employment Re-
duce Unemployment?, 23 J. Bus. Venturing 673, 674 (2008) (discussing whether an increase in 
unemployment leads to an increase in startup activity because the opportunity cost of starting 
a firm has decreased). 
243 See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Instead of Work, Younger Women Head to School, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 28, 2011, at A4 (reporting that young women in school outnumber those in the work-
force, and describing the risks associated with resultant student loan debt). 
244 See Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in Past Year, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
13, 2011 (reporting an 8.8% default rate on student loans); Katherine Meyer, Little Guys 
Tough It Out, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 2011, at B4 (reporting that only forty-seven percent of 
businesses launched in 2005 survived at least five years). 
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goal.245 Nonetheless, social mobility has been linked to a stronger mid-
dle class, greater economic opportunity, and political stability.246 It has a 
moderating impact on society. Employers’ use of financial histories re-
flects only one of many barriers to social mobility, but, even as an in-
cremental barrier, the practice poses significant policy concerns. 
D. Addressing Defects in Consumers’ Decision-Making Abilities 
 Employers frequently scrutinize applicants’ financial backgrounds 
to learn about these individuals’ capacity to be responsible: to complete 
tasks and assignments promptly; to defer, when appropriate, to their 
superiors; and to play by the rules of a particular organization.247 In the 
process, however, employers are relying on two important assumptions: 
(1) that credit reports and financial histories are valid measures of an 
individual’s capacity to be responsible or conscientious, and (2) that 
there is a meaningful relationship between an individual’s responsibil-
ity levels and his or her capacity to be a responsible employee. The fail-
ure of either one of these assumptions casts significant doubt on the 
logic of using financial histories in the employment and licensing set-
tings. Elsewhere in this Article, I discuss the empirical relationship be-
tween credit reports and key personality traits like conscientiousness.248 
In this Section, I address to what extent behavioral economics has rede-
fined what it means for a consumer to exhibit “responsibility” or “con-
scientiousness” in his or her financial life.249 
 Pursuant to neoclassical economic theory, laws that would bar em-
ployers and licensing organizations from considering applicants’ credit 
reports or financial histories are ill-advised because these prohibitions 
conflict with sacrosanct principles of individual autonomy.250 Antidis-
                                                                                                                      
245 E.g., Reihan Salam, Should We Care About Relative Mobility?, Nat’l Rev. Online, (Nov. 
29, 2011, 3:50 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/284379/should-we-care-about-
relative-mobility-reihan-salam. 
246 See Peter M. Blau & Otis Dudley Duncan, The American Occupational 
Structure 439 (1978) (“The stability of American democracy is undoubtedly related to 
the superior chances of upward mobility in this country, its high standard of living, and the 
low degree of status deference between social strata.”); see also Sabrina Tavernise, Middle-
Class Areas Shrink as Income Gap Grows, New Study Finds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2011, at A16 
(discussing a new study that indicates that the number of American families living in mid-
dle-class neighborhoods is declining, suggesting a new “prosperity map” in the United 
States with a shrinking middle-class and a “growing concern about inequality”). 
247 See supra notes 116–136 and accompanying text (discussing the Responsibility Hy-
pothesis). 
248 See supra notes 116–136 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 250–279 and accompanying text. 
250 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 3–27 (2011). 
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crimination laws, as one commentator has argued, reflect “a dramatic 
rejection of classical liberal notions of freedom of contract.”251 Individ-
ual applicants theoretically have the freedom to limit, through negotia-
tion, employers’ access to applicants’ financial histories. Indeed, the 
FCRA—the federal law that governs creditors’ and others’ use of credit 
reports—codifies this principle.252 Under the FCRA, employers must 
secure applicants’ permission to access applicants’ consumer reports.253 
Because an applicant can safeguard the contents of her credit report by 
refusing to sign the employer’s authorization form, a blanket prohibi-
tion on employers’ use of applicants’ financial histories is arguably un-
necessary.254 
 If one subscribes to the rule that interference with freedom of 
contract should be limited, restrictions on employers’ and applicants’ 
freedom to negotiate the terms of the evaluation process must have 
substantial countervailing benefits. I argue that the lessons of behav-
ioral economics, when applied to credit reporting, help justify a prohi-
bition on employers’ consideration of applicants’ financial histories. 
 In concluding that a consumer’s financial history reveals a certain 
level of financial responsibility, employers are relying on several impor-
tant neoclassical economic assumptions about the contracting process 
and consumers’ decision-making abilities. A consumer who is deemed 
to be “responsible” for a given default is attributed with a considerable 
amount of power and autonomy.255 A consumer, for example, is pre-
sumed not to have suffered from material disadvantages in the con-
tracting process. He or she is presumed to have been capable of maxi-
mizing his or her own self-interest in deciding whether to enter into a 
contract and under what terms.256 In the event that a consumer filed 
for bankruptcy or defaulted on a particular debt, his or her decision is 
                                                                                                                      
251 See John J. Donohue, Antidiscrimination Law, in 2 Handbook of Law and Econom-
ics 1387, 1390 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
252 15 U.S.C. § 1681–1681t (2006). 
253 Id. § 1681b(b)(2). 
254 But see infra notes 314–315 and accompanying text (explaining that these contracts 
are functionally adhesive because employers may be unwilling or unable to deviate from 
standardized assessment procedures). 
255 See Posner, supra note 250, at 23–25 (discussing conventional rational choice the-
ory and game theory in evaluating how a rational person will react in various situations). 
256 Law and economics scholars presume that individuals exhibit rational choice: they 
are “self-interested utility maximizers with stable preferences and the capacity to optimally 
accumulate and assess information.” See Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral 
Economic Analysis of Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1765, 1766 (1998). Neoclassical economists ac-
knowledge that certain deviations from the rational choice model occur, but contend that 
these deviations are not systematic. See id. at 1767. 
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presumed to be the result of an opportunistic cost-benefit calculation: 
the consumer concluded that repaying the debt would be more costly 
than defaulting on it.257 
 Over the past several decades, behavioral economists have cast seri-
ous doubt on the assumptions underlying rational choice theory. Indi-
viduals exhibit bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded 
self-interest.258 Behavioral economists have shown, for example, that 
individuals systematically make poor decisions that are inconsistent with 
their preferences. Individuals use incomplete heuristics—or rules of 
thumb—that cause them to make bad decisions.259 Consumers tend to 
be overly optimistic about the future.260 They exercise poor impulse 
control.261 Individuals’ preferences for and valuations of certain goods 
and services are affected by how those goods and services are framed.262 
Scholars have observed the effects of cognitive biases in the housing 
market,263 and in credit card transactions.264 Competitive forces compel 
sophisticated sellers to capitalize on these cognitive biases in drafting 
contract terms.265 The implications of behavioral economists’ findings 
are stark and disconcerting: individuals systematically and predictably 
                                                                                                                      
257 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 36, at 1493–95 (explaining that, pursuant to the 
ex ante incentive analysis of consumer default, “the lure of the discharge proves irresistible 
to strategically minded consumer borrowers”). 
258 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational 198–99 (1957); Chris-
tine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1476 
(1998); see also Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Eco-
nomics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449, 1449 (2003) (discussing research that “attempted to ob-
tain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the 
beliefs that people have and the choices they make”). 
259 See Jackson, supra note 184, at 1411–12. 
260 Id. at 1414. 
261 Id. at 1408. 
262 See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1729, 1735 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228–29 (2003) (discussing the “endowment effect,” which refers to “the 
principle that people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do 
not,” and its role in law and economics). 
263 In his analysis of subprime mortgages, Professor Oren Bar-Gill has examined why so 
many consumers entered into subprime mortgages that were not, in fact, welfare-
maximizing, and which frequently resulted in foreclosures. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Eco-
nomics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1073, 1075 (2009). 
Professor Bar-Gill explains that many consumers were harmed by mortgages with a small 
monthly payment and a small down payment because many borrowers overestimated both 
their ability to afford future high payments and the likelihood that home prices would rise. 
Id. at 1079. In addition, because the true cost of a mortgage was difficult to ascertain, con-
sumers may have been unable to adequately gauge their ability to afford the loan. Id. 
264 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1375 (2004). 
265 Id. at 1373. 
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make choices that they themselves—if only they possessed complete informa-
tion—would perceive as wrong.266 
 Behavioral economists’ conclusions have called into question ra-
tional choice theorists’ principle of nonintervention. If consumers are 
unable to maximize their welfare in the contracting process, it may be 
appropriate for regulators to intervene. Some have suggested how reg-
ulators can improve financial disclosures to better enable consumers to 
overcome myopia and the optimism bias.267 Regulators can also re-
structure default rules—ones that consumers tend not to change—and 
other laws to better reflect consumers’ subjective preferences.268 Pre-
serving consumers’ access to a bankruptcy discharge, for example, may 
compensate for consumers’ frequent inability to make decisions that 
“accurately reflect their own subjective preferences for consumption 
versus savings.”269 
                                                                                                                     
 The conclusions of behavioral economists yield a related conclu-
sion in the context of employers’ and licensing organizations’ consid-
eration of applicants’ financial histories. Employers’ and licensing or-
ganizations’ consideration of credit reports in the employment context 
are an implicit attempt to punish and deter certain conduct (to en-
courage debt repayment) or to allocate a crucial social good—a job— 
based upon the wisdom of consumers’ financial decisions. To the ex-
tent that consumers’ choices are fueled less by a scientific, cost-benefit 
analysis, and more by imperfect decision-making shortcuts, use of fi-
nancial histories in the employment setting may miss the mark. Given 
ambiguities about the merits of enforcing particular consumer con-
tracts that are the products of systematic cognitive errors, it is arguably 
unjust to allow an employer—an uneducated third party—to make 
consequential inferences about a debtor based upon his or her record 
of bankruptcies and defaults. Default is less probative of an applicant’s 
level of “financial responsibility” than traditional models suggest. 
 Thus, just as legal scholars have suggested that the legal rules and 
sanctions governing debt default must be reconsidered to account for 
weaknesses in the neoclassical model, the nonlegal sanctions of debt de-
 
266 Jackson, supra note 184, at 1414 n.65. 
267 Bar-Gill, supra note 263, at 1086 (recommending that regulators require lenders to 
incorporate the prepayment option in required disclosures of the annual percentage rate). 
268 See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 4 (2006) (“[T]he default rule rev-
olution in part has been an attempt to show lawmakers that they can move the world with-
out restricting contractual freedom. Merely by changing the default, lawmakers—courts 
and legislators—can affect the equilibrium.”). 
269 Jackson, supra note 184, at 1412. 
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fault—including employers’ ability to refuse to hire applicants with ad-
verse financial backgrounds—must likewise be reevaluated. Behavioral 
economists’ findings suggest that it may be appropriate for states and 
municipalities to impose limits on this practice, even though doing so 
reduces consumers’ power to decide for themselves—through contract-
ing—whether or not to grant employers or licensing organizations ac-
cess to their financial histories. 
 Employers may argue that imposing a mandatory financial antidis-
crimination rule may be overbroad, since employers themselves may be 
able to distinguish between applicants on the basis of those factors that 
contributed to applicants’ financial adversity. Presumably, employers 
have no interest in penalizing applicants whose financial transgressions 
are attributable to cognitive defects unrelated to job performance.270 
Indeed, employers who scrutinize applicants’ credit reports contend 
that they often provide applicants with an opportunity to “explain” 
those factors that triggered their bankruptcies or financial lapses.271 
Employers claim not to penalize applicants whose financial problems 
were triggered by a divorce, a job loss, a health problem, or some other 
unavoidable life problem.272 In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage 
crisis in which millions of Americans lost their homes,273 employers also 
claim to discount foreclosures.274 Foreclosures may have been de-
stigmatized because they have struck consumers frequently and seem-
ingly capriciously. Alternatively or additionally, the extent of a con-
sumer’s responsibility for a given foreclosure may be too difficult to as-
sess, since the recent foreclosure crisis implicated numerous groups, 
                                                                                                                      
270 See supra notes 263–266 and accompanying text. Alternatively, however, employers 
may presume that individuals who suffer from cognitive limitations in their personal lives 
may make poorer decisions in the workplace. Thus, if employers were capable of distin-
guishing between applicants who suffer from cognitive impairments and those who do not, 
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271 Background Checking, supra note 60, at 9 (reporting that 87% of employers claim 
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272 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Tr., supra note 165, at 32 (Devata). 
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including government regulators, securitization participants, mortgage 
servicers, and consumers.275 
 Providing applicants with an opportunity to explain the causes of 
defaults and bankruptcies, however, cannot sufficiently address the 
problems raised by behavioral economists. Several of the factors that 
employers claim to discount—a divorce, a job loss, or a health prob-
lem—are intervening life events that are commonly understood to af-
fect many individuals somewhat indiscriminately.276 These do not, in 
and of themselves, reflect cognitive biases. Indeed, it is likely very diffi-
cult or impossible for employers to deduce which consumer contracts 
are the products of cognitive irrationality and which are not. Applicants 
themselves may be unconscious of these biases or the role they played 
in the applicant’s default.277 Thus, a prohibition on employers’ consid-
eration of financial histories is justified, since it is likely too difficult or 
too costly to distinguish effectively between those consumers whose fi-
nancial problems resulted from cognitive biases and those whose finan-
cial problems truly might signify more acute, “rational” financial irre-
sponsibility. 
 Many might argue that the findings of behavioral economists can-
not justify a wholesale ban on employers’ and licensing organizations’ 
consideration of financial histories. The prescriptive and normative 
implications of behavioral economics remain tentative because behav-
ioral economists do not yet have a “coherent, robust, tractable model of 
human behavior,” making it difficult to make policy recommendations 
based on these findings.278 Likewise, cognitive biases are reduced as 
individuals learn by experience, work within organizations, or obtain 
advice from experts.279 Observations about the systematic and predict-
able defects in consumers’ decision-making abilities, however, coupled 
with concerns about social mobility and racial equality, suggest, at the 
very least, that the decades-old presumption that financial histories are 
useful and helpful sources of information about an employee’s merits 
should be more rigorously challenged. 
                                                                                                                      
275 Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv., R40173, Causes of the Financial Crisis 
5–10 (2010) (identifying, among other factors, imprudent mortgage lending, risky finan-
cial activities, securitization, and deregulation as possible causes of the financial crisis). 
276 See Sullivan et al., supra note 112, at 2 (explaining that bankruptcies are, in large 
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III. Why an Antidiscrimination Norm Is Necessary and 
Preferable to Alternative Solutions 
 This Part explains why a significant expansion in financial history 
antidiscrimination laws is both necessary and preferable to alternative 
solutions.280 It first describes how the FCRA and the Bankruptcy Code’s 
antidiscrimination provisions provide inadequate protection to appli-
cants.281 It then explains the limitations of an alternative solution: codi-
fying employers’ current practice of allowing some applicants to ex-
plain what mitigating factors contributed to problems with their credit 
history.282 Next, this Part describes how a new antidiscrimination norm 
can protect employers from the consequences of false stereotypes and 
the threat of some negligent hiring suits.283 Finally, this Part concludes 
by explaining that, although antidiscriminatory sentiments have gained 
traction during the Great Recession, genuine reform efforts must be 
unconstrained by majoritarian pressures and timing.284 
A. Why Current Legal Protections Are Inadequate 
1. The Fair Credit Reporting Act Emphasizes Access and Accuracy, Not 
Relevancy 
 How did consumers’ financial history become a widely utilized tool 
in the employment process? In large part, a 1970 statute designed to 
increase accuracy and privacy in the credit reporting industry—the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)285—is responsible for legitimizing em-
ployers’ use of financial histories.286 
 In passing the FCRA, Congress sought to correct key defects in the 
procedures by which the previously unregulated credit reporting indus-
                                                                                                                      
280 See infra notes 281–418 and accompanying text. 
281 See infra notes 285–402 and accompanying text. 
282 See infra notes 403–410 and accompanying text. 
283 See infra notes 411–413 and accompanying text. 
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try operated. The industry was secretive and enigmatic.287 Consumers 
did not know when and by whom their credit reports were being util-
ized.288 Consumers had no access to their consumer reports.289 In addi-
tion, they could not correct incomplete, irrelevant, or obsolete informa-
tion.290 Simultaneously, however, consumer reports were often issued to 
outsiders for “dubious purposes.”291 Congressional witnesses cited re-
ports of individuals accessing consumer reports to evaluate prospective 
husbands and sons-in-law.292 Indeed, some consumer reporting agencies 
would, for an additional fee, also perform private investigative work for 
customers.293 When employers used an applicant’s consumer report in 
deciding not to hire the applicant, the employer was prohibited by its 
contract with the consumer reporting agency from disclosing to the ap-
plicant that the consumer report played any role in the decision.294 As a 
result, job applicants had no idea that adverse and frequently erroneous 
or subjective information in their consumer reports might be “control-
ling [their] troubled careers.”295 Even if job applicants discovered that 
consumer reporting agencies were disseminating inaccurate informa-
tion, they had virtually no legal recourse. Because consumer reporting 
agencies were largely insulated from defamation claims,296 agencies en-
                                                                                                                      
 
287 See Hearings, Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 33 (statement of Paul Rand Dix-
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295 See id. at 88–89. 
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ers who suffered damages from inaccurate credit reports, because credit bureaus have a 
“qualified privilege to disseminate inaccurate and even defamatory information so long as 
they act without malice.” See Pridgen & Alderman, supra note 52, § 2:2. Today, common 
law actions have largely been superseded by the FCRA’s less demanding negligence stan-
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joyed “virtual immunity from judicial accountability.”297 According to 
one witness, a “veil of secrecy” surrounded these agencies; many per-
ceived the credit reporting industry to hold the “power of life and 
death” over consumers and their financial futures.298 
 The defects in the procedures by which the industry operated are 
precisely those described by Professor Dan Solove in his examination of 
the “database problem”: the privacy problems triggered by the collec-
tion and use of information by computer databases and the Internet.299 
Professor Solove argues that, in conceptualizing the issue, commenta-
tors can compare the database problem to Franz Kafka’s depiction of 
“bureaucracy” in The Trial.300 Like the protagonist in The Trial, con-
sumers confronting consumer reporting agencies faced “bureaucratic 
indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization.”301 The legislative 
history of the FCRA reveals that credit reporting agencies created an 
atmosphere in which “people fe[lt] powerless and vulnerable, without 
any meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their 
information.”302 
 Indeed, Congress seized on the metaphor of a broken trial in 
framing the essential problems plaguing the credit reporting industry. 
Senator William Proxmire, a leading sponsor of the FCRA,303 com-
plained that “the consumer is confronted with an organized conspiracy 
of silence when he attempts to learn the contents of his credit re-
port.”304 Senator Proxmire argued that in a fair society, “standards of 
justice require that the individual be confronted with the charges raised 
against him and be given full opportunity to refute them.”305 Thus, in 
crafting credit reporting industry regulations, Congress’s primary ob-
jective was to give consumers a meaningful participatory role in an oth-
erwise ex parte “trial” that had the potential to deprive a consumer of 
credit, insurance, and employment. 
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 The obligations that the FCRA imposes on employers are consis-
tent with this metaphor and message. The FCRA imposes responsibili-
ties on employers at three major stages of the evaluation process. First, 
before pulling an applicant’s credit report, an employer must clearly 
disclose that it may obtain a report for employment purposes.306 Addi-
tionally, the employer must obtain the applicant’s consent to access the 
report.307 Second, if an employer intends to deny employment to the 
applicant based in whole or in part on information in a credit report, 
the employer must first provide the applicant with a pre-adverse action 
disclosure that includes a copy of the credit report.308 Third, if the em-
ployer ultimately decides not to hire the applicant based on informa-
tion in her credit report, the employer must provide the applicant with 
an adverse action notice (1) informing the applicant that such action 
was taken based in whole or in part on information in the consumer 
report, (2) listing the contact information of the credit reporting 
agency that supplied the report to the employer, and (3) describing the 
consumer’s right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any infor-
mation in the report and his or her right to receive a free credit report 
from the credit reporting agency.309 In imposing these requirements, 
Congress envisioned that job applicants, armed with employers’ disclo-
sures, could monitor the contents of their credit reports and, when 
necessary, correct any errors or explain any adverse credit information 
that might otherwise impact applicants’ job eligibility.310 
 Requiring employers to secure applicants’ permission before ac-
cessing applicants’ credit reports seemingly gives individuals control 
over the information in their credit reports.311 Prospective employees 
and licensees ostensibly hold a key to the database containing their 
personal information—a key that they may withhold for any reason. 
This is consistent with a normative principle embedded within Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s traditional conceptions of privacy: that an 
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individual should have the right to control the release of information 
about his or her person.312 
 The requirement that employers secure applicants’ permission is 
intended to alert job applicants that credit histories may be used in 
connection with the hiring process and give them an opportunity to 
opt out of the process.313 In reality, however, job applicants likely have 
little real choice in the matter.314 An applicant who refuses to submit to 
a financial history screening likely effectively removes him or herself 
from consideration for the position, because the employer may be un-
able or unwilling to deviate from its standardized vetting process.315 
The contract is functionally adhesive. An individual’s choice is to “take 
or leave” the employer’s terms—and, thus, her chance at a job. 
 Congress’s use of a “broken trial” metaphor to describe the prob-
lems plaguing consumers was not incorrect, but it presupposed that the 
decisionmaker—an employer—is justified in using a consumer’s credit 
report in rendering a meaningful decision about a consumer. In other 
words, the FCRA glosses over the fundamental and threshold question 
of whether employers’ consideration of applicants’ financial histories is 
itself appropriate. 
 In the FCRA, Congress did address some important questions of 
relevancy. For example, it limited creditors’ and employers’ access to 
old—or “obsolete” —information in credit reports.316 Credit reporting 
agencies may not report most adverse information more than seven 
years old.317 Witnesses also objected to the very sensitive and personal 
information contained in some reports, triggering some reform within 
the industry.318 At the time the FCRA was passed, however, the industry 
was already quite large, and Congress recognized that credit reporting 
                                                                                                                      
312 Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1805, 1832 
(2010); see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 
193, 198–99 (1890). 
313 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Record, supra note 14 (statement of Maneesha Mithal) 
(explaining that the FCRA’s notification requirement “serves an important role by alerting 
job applicants and employees to the fact that the employer may consider consumer report 
information in connection with the consumer’s application or employment”). 
314 Desmond, supra note 17, at 909 (“[J]ob seekers and employees have little real 
choice about whether or not to allow employers to obtain credit reports.”). 
315 With as many as sixty percent of employers utilizing credit reports in the hiring 
process, applicants have little leverage in influencing employers’ screening methods. See 
Background Checking, supra note 60, at 3, 9. 
316 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2006). 
317 Id. Bankruptcies, however, may be reported for as long as ten years. Id. § 1681c(a)(1); 
Wu & De Armond, supra note 25, § 5.2.1. 
318 See Hearings, Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 75 (statement of Alan F. Westin) 
(describing the “overly intrusive” information contained in consumer reports). 
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was indispensable to the fair allocation and pricing of credit.319 In ap-
parent deference to the industry’s critical economic role, Congress left 
intact the default credit and non-credit uses of credit reports, address-
ing only the procedures governing the industry.320 
 The legislative history does not suggest that Congress specifically 
endorsed the view that financial histories were necessarily relevant to 
employers’ scrutiny of employees. By designating employers and licens-
ing organizations as permissible users of credit reports,321 Congress ap-
pears to have intended to subject insurance companies and employers 
to government oversight.322 Its desire was to limit abuses by the credit 
reporting industry and to ensure that basic privacy controls were ob-
served.323 In deferring to the default uses of credit reporting agencies 
and failing to question the wisdom of employers’ use of financial in-
formation, however, Congress implicitly sanctioned and legitimized 
employers’ use of financial histories. 
 Because the statute’s protections emphasize consumer access and 
neglect questions of the relevancy of the information provided to em-
ployers, employers regularly consider bankruptcies and debt histories in 
assessing job candidates’ relative merits.324 An antidiscrimination rule— 
one that makes a prima facie assessment of the relevancy of this infor-
mation—is thus a necessary supplement to the gaps within the FCRA. 
2. The Bankruptcy Code Inadequately Protects Filers from Extralegal 
Sanctions for Debt Default 
a. Courts’ Narrow Interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code’s Antidiscrimination 
Provisions Dilute the Fresh Start 
 In the American legal system, consumers with excessive debts can 
seek a financial “fresh start” by filing for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy 
Code establishes a collective forum in which all of a consumer’s debts— 
secured and unsecured—are categorized and satisfied either through a 
                                                                                                                      
319 See id. at 13 (statement of Virginia H. Knauer) (describing the vast size of the credit 
reporting industry). 
320 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
321 Id. § 1681a(d)(1)(c) (incorporating § 1681b(a)(3)(B)). 
322 See Hearings, Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 31, at 65 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) 
(explaining that legislators included in the definition of “credit rating” a reference to 
“character and general reputation” to enable Congress to regulate insurers and employers, 
entities that committed “a large proportion of . . . abuses”). 
323 See id. 
324 See supra notes 55–99 and accompanying text. 
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sale of all of the debtor’s non-exempt325 assets (i.e., a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion)326 or through the creation of a plan under which the debtor 
agrees to pay creditors’ claims from future income over a three-year or 
five-year period (i.e., a Chapter 13 rehabilitation).327 To preserve debt-
ors’ right to file for bankruptcy and to ensure debtors’ unimpeded ac-
cess to the “fresh start” that it promises, two sections of the Bankruptcy 
Code—525(a) and 525(b)—provide limited antidiscrimination protec-
tion to bankruptcy filers in the employment context.328 Although bank-
ruptcy is an institutionalized form of debt-forgiveness available to every 
debtor, its “fresh start” is noticeably circumscribed because courts have 
interpreted these antidiscrimination provisions very narrowly.329 Con-
sequently, most employers can refuse to hire those who have sought 
bankruptcy relief.330 Courts’ narrow interpretations of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s antidiscrimination provisions represent a key weakness in cur-
rent financial history antidiscrimination policies. 
 Section 525(a) codifies331 Perez v. Campbell, the 1971 Supreme 
Court case that invalidated, under the Supremacy Clause, a provision of 
an Arizona state law requiring state officials to suspend the drivers’ li-
censes of motorists who failed to satisfy judgments resulting from car 
accidents.332 The Court concluded that this state law, which expressly 
provided that the tortfeasor’s obligations were unaffected by a bank-
ruptcy filing, interfered with a debtor’s right to a fresh start.333 
                                                                                                                      
325 Chapter 7 debtors may retain certain property that they already owned at the time 
they filed for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006) (listing as partially exempt the debt-
or’s residence, one motor vehicle, and tools of the debtor’s trade (among other items)). 
326 Charles Jordan Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy § 1.23, at 92 (2009). 
327 Id. § 1.25, at 105. 
328 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b). A third provision prohibits discrimination against debtor-
borrowers on the basis of discharged, unrepaid loans by governmental units operating a 
student loan or grant program. Id. § 525(c). 
329 Although debtors need not be insolvent to file for bankruptcy, Congress in 2005 
enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, which instituted 
a “means test” that excludes from Chapter 7 those consumers deemed to have sufficient 
projected future repayment capacity. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 22, 119 Stat. 23, 29 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
707(b) (2006)); see Tabb, supra note 326, § 2.15, at 180. These consumers may instead file 
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). 
330 See infra notes 331–347 and accompanying text. 
331 S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978). 
332 402 U.S. 637, 656 (1971); see 11 U.S.C. § 525. The Constitution gives Congress the 
power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject 
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
333 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 649. 
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 In the legislative history of § 525(a), lawmakers indicated that 
courts should interpret the antidiscrimination provisions expansively, 
describing the new legislation as a mere first step in protecting indi-
viduals’ right to file for bankruptcy and to seek a fresh financial start: 
[This] section is not exhaustive. The enumeration of various 
forms of discrimination against former bankrupts is not in-
tended to permit other forms of discrimination. The courts 
have been developing the Perez rule. This section permits fur-
ther development to prohibit actions by governmental or qua-
si-governmental organizations that perform licensing func-
tions, such as a State bar association or a medical society, or by 
other organizations that can seriously affect the debtors’ liveli-
hood or fresh start, such as exclusion from a union on the ba-
sis of discharge of a debt to the union’s credit union. . . . The 
courts will continue to mark the contours of the antidiscrimi-
nation provision in pursuit of sound bankruptcy policy.334 
In spite of this invitation to courts to interpret the antidiscrimination 
provisions broadly, courts have been reluctant to do so.335 Instead, 
courts have narrowly interpreted these provisions in three major ways. 
First, private employers may refuse employment to bankruptcy filers.336 
Second, any employer—private or public—may discriminate against a 
future bankruptcy filer.337 Future bankruptcy filers include those who 
may have articulated a good faith intention to pursue bankruptcy relief 
but who have not yet formally filed a petition. Third, any employer may 
discriminate against a bankruptcy filer, so long as the bankruptcy filing 
was not the sole factor in the employer’s decision.338 I discuss each limi-
tation in turn. 
                                                                                                                      
334 S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81. Section 525(a), prohibiting discrimination against debt-
ors by government entities, was passed six years prior to § 525(b)’s enactment. Because, 
however, the provisions of § 525(b) are nearly identical to those of § 525(a), courts have 
consulted the legislative history of § 525(a) in assessing Congress’s intent in passing 
§ 525(b). See, e.g., Leonard v. St. Rose Dominican Hosp. (In re Majewski), 310 F.3d 653, 
658–59 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). 
335 See, e.g., Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 941 (3d Cir. 2010); Stinson v. 
BB&T Inv. Servs. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 250 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002). 
336 See infra notes 339–347 and accompanying text. 
337 See infra notes 348–371 and accompanying text. 
338 See infra notes 372–380 and accompanying text. 
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i. Private Employers’ Right to Deny Employment to Bank-
ruptcy Filers 
 Under § 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a public employer may 
not “deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discrimi-
nate with respect to employment against” a current or former debtor 
under the Bankruptcy Code.339 Section 525(b), in contrast, provides 
that a private employer may not “terminate the employment of, or dis-
criminate with respect to employment against” a current or former 
debtor.340 
 These provisions are noticeably different from one another. Con-
gress included the phrase “deny employment” from the list of actions 
that public employers are prohibited from taking, but it omitted the 
phrase in the provision governing private employers. Applying the ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory interpretation, almost 
all courts have thus concluded that Congress intended to permit pri-
vate—but not public—employers to refuse to hire bankruptcy filers.341 
Courts have maintained this opinion in cases in which the refusal is 
motivated exclusively by the fact that the applicant has sought bank-
ruptcy protection.342 
 One court has deviated from this interpretation. In a heavily criti-
cized decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York in Leary v. Warnaco, Inc. held that § 525(b) does, in fact, prohibit 
                                                                                                                      
339 Section 525(a) provides in relevant part: 
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a li-
cense, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a 
grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment 
to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment 
against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or 
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bank-
rupt or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is 
or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the case 
under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied 
a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this 
title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act. 
11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2006). 
340 Id. § 525(b). 
341 See Rea, 627 F.3d at 941; Fiorani v. Caci, 192 B.R. 401, 407 (E.D. Va. 1996); Pastore, 
186 B.R. at 555. 
342 See Rea, 627 F.3d at 941; Fiorani, 192 B.R. at 407. 
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private employers from refusing to hire current or former debtors.343 
The court implied that Congress’s omission of the phrase “deny em-
ployment” from § 525(b) was a scrivener’s error.344 It concluded that 
the phrase “may not . . . discriminate with respect to employment” —a 
prohibition applicable to both private and public employers— encom-
passes all aspects of employment, including hiring, firing, and material 
changes in job conditions.345 The court had difficulty reconciling the 
stark inconsistency between the two provisions with the rehabilitative 
functions of bankruptcy law, concluding that the Bankruptcy Code’s 
“fresh start” policy mandated that the longer list of prohibited activities 
apply to both private and public employers.346 The court thus con-
cluded that the plaintiff, whose offer of employment for an executive 
assistant position had been rescinded following the employer’s review 
of the plaintiff’s credit report, had stated a valid claim.347 
ii. Discrimination Against Future Bankruptcy Filers 
 Section 525 prevents employers from discriminating against an 
individual who “is or has been a debtor” under the Bankruptcy 
Code.348 In interpreting this provision, some courts have held that both 
public and private employers may discriminate against future filers: in-
dividuals who have not yet sought bankruptcy relief.349 Even those indi-
viduals who have expressed a good faith intention to file for bankruptcy 
receive no protection.350 
                                                                                                                     
 In the only appellate case to address this issue, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Majewski held that an employer 
did not violate the Bankruptcy Code’s antidiscrimination provisions 
 
343 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Other courts have declined to follow Leary. See, 
e.g., In re Stinson, 285 B.R. at 250 (“Section 525(b) prohibits discrimination with respect to 
employment, but this prohibition does not include hiring decisions.”). 
344 See Leary, 251 B.R. at 658 (“A Court should not go out of its way to place such an ab-
surd gloss on a remedial statute, simply because the scrivener was more verbose in writing 
§ 525(a).”). 
345 Id. 
346 Id. (“The evil being legislated against is no different when an employer fires a 
debtor simply for seeking refuge in bankruptcy, as contrasted with refusing to hire a per-
son who does so. The ‘fresh start’ policy is impaired in either case.”). 
347 Id. at 657, 659. 
348 11 U.S.C. § 525(b)(1) (2006). 
349 In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 656. But see Mayo v. Union Bank (In re Mayo), 322 B.R. 
712, 717 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005) (holding that an adverse action taken against a prospective 
bankruptcy filer may be actionable under § 525); Tinker v. Sturgeon State Bank (In re 
Tinker), 99 B.R. 957, 960 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (same). 
350 See In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 656. 
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when it fired an employee after the employee informed the employer 
that he intended to file for bankruptcy.351 The court held that, because 
the employee had not yet filed for bankruptcy and had never previously 
filed (the employee was thus neither a current nor a former debtor 
under the Bankruptcy Code), § 525 did not prohibit the employer 
from terminating the employee.352 
 The Ninth Circuit declined the debtor’s invitation to interpret 
§ 525 broadly, consistent with courts’ interpretations of anti-retaliation 
provisions of remedial statutes like Title VII and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.353 The majority conceded that these anti-retaliation provi-
sions protect employees who express a clear intent to exercise one or 
more rights under these statutes.354 They do not merely protect those 
individuals who have formally asserted their rights by, for example, fil-
ing a complaint or instituting a proceeding against an employer.355 
 The majority explained, however, that courts’ broad interpretation 
of anti-retaliation provisions in these whistle-blower statutes is critical to 
their effectiveness, since the government relies on employees to report 
employer misconduct.356 In contrast, a similarly broad interpretation of 
the Bankruptcy Code’s antidiscrimination provisions is unnecessary to 
give full effect to the Bankruptcy Code’s policies.357 Although the court 
wanted to encourage debtors to report employers’ violations of the an-
tidiscrimination provisions and to protect individuals who had formally 
sought bankruptcy protection, the court “[did] not wish to encourage 
persons to file for bankruptcy or to threaten bankruptcy.”358 
 According to the majority, individuals who have filed for bank-
ruptcy are more deserving of protection than those who have not yet 
formally filed, since bankruptcy involves a quid pro quo.359 In ex-
change for the protections triggered by a formal bankruptcy filing (in-
cluding antidiscrimination protection and a temporary suspension of 
creditors’ collection efforts through the imposition of the automatic 
                                                                                                                      
 of 1964, 42 
U.S.  Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006). 
 Majewski, 310 F.3d at 655. 
tho ho have invoked the bankruptcy law’s protections to obtain a fresh start.”). 
351 Id. 
352 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 525(b)(1). 
353 In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 655; see, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Fair Labor
354 In re
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 655. 
357 See id. (“While we encourage reporting of statutory violations, we do not wish to en-
courage persons to file for bankruptcy or to threaten bankruptcy. We wish only to protect 
se persons w
358 Id. 
359 See id. at 656. 
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stay360), the debtor, according to the majority, turns over assets to the 
bankruptcy estate and “repay[s] debts that can be paid.”361 
.365 
                                                                                                                     
 The dissent described the majority’s construction of § 525 as ex-
cessively formalistic and inconsistent with Congress’s clear intent in the 
Bankruptcy Code to provide debtors with an unhampered fresh 
start.362 The dissent explained that § 525, which prohibits certain types 
of discrimination against one “who is or has been a debtor,” is ambigu-
ous.363 The phrase, as the majority contended, may mean that a debtor 
must file for bankruptcy before he or she can be the subject of “dis-
crimination.”364 Under this view, the provision provides no protection 
to an employee who is terminated moments before he or she formally 
files the bankruptcy petition—an interpretation that, the dissent ar-
gued, sets up an absurd footrace between an employer and a prospec-
tive bankruptcy filer
 Alternatively, as the dissent explained, the phrase “who is or has 
been a debtor” may be more circumscribed—referring only to a re-
quirement that an individual have attained the status of “debtor” (by 
filing a formal bankruptcy petition) before he or she sues a former em-
ployer under § 525.366 It is not clear, the dissent claimed, that the indi-
vidual is protected under the provision only if the employer’s discrimi-
nation occurred after he or she formally filed for bankruptcy relief.367 
 The dissent argued that interpreting § 525 to permit an employer 
to terminate an employee after the employer has learned of the em-
ployee’s intention to file for bankruptcy would create a result inconsis-
tent with the intentions of the Bankruptcy Code’s drafters, who passed 
§ 525 to ensure that employers could not frustrate the congressional 
policy of providing debtors with a fresh start.368 Courts broadly inter-
pret anti-retaliation provisions of remedial statutes like Title VII not 
merely to encourage whistle-blowing, but also to prevent employers 
from discouraging employees from exercising individual statutory 
rights.369 According to the dissent, the majority’s decision, which pro-
vided no protection to future bankruptcy filers, encouraged the precise 
 
360 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
361 In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 656; see 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2006). 
362 In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 656–57 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
363 Id. at 657. 
364 Id. 
365 Id. at 660. 
366 Id. at 658–59. 
367 Id. at 658–59. 
368 In re Majewski, 310 F.3d at 658 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978)). 
369 Id. at 661–62. 
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result that the majority sought to avoid.370 By providing limited em-
ployment protection only to those who have formally filed for bank-
ruptcy, employees have an incentive to “file first and talk later.”371 
iii. Mixed Motive Cases 
 Section 525 provides that employers may not discriminate against a 
current or former bankruptcy filer “solely because” such an individual 
has filed for bankruptcy, has been insolvent before or during the bank-
ruptcy case, or has failed to pay a debt that was discharged or is dis-
chargeable in the case.372 The vast majority of courts have interpreted 
this phrase narrowly, requiring aggrieved claimants to establish that the 
prohibited factor was the exclusive reason for the employer’s discrimi-
natory treatment.373 
 A minority of courts have argued that the same burden of proof 
used in Title VII discrimination claims should be applied to Bankruptcy 
Code discrimination cases.374 According to these courts, it is too bur-
densome to require employees to prove that no other factors weighed 
in the employer’s decision to terminate the employee’s position.375 
These courts argue that an employer’s discrimination against a bank-
ruptcy filer is unlawful under § 525 if the bankruptcy filing, insolvency, 
or failure to pay a dischargeable debt played a “significant role” in the 
employer’s decision,376 or if the employer would not have discrimi-
nated against the employee “but for” the employee’s bankruptcy fil-
ing.377 
                                                                                                                      
 
§ 52
 employer fired her due only to bankruptcy . . . . To interpret ‘solely’ as re-
quir  conflict with the policies of the Bank-
rup
ough the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 279, 310 (2010) (noting that the 
 
370 Id. at 663–64 n.10. 
371 Id. 
372 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2006). 
373 See, e.g., White v. Kentuckiana Livestock Market, Inc., 397 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir. 
2005); Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1989). 
374 See, e.g., Bell v. Sanford-Corbitt-Bruker, Inc., No. CV186-201, 1987 WL 60286, at *4 
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1987) (applying the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973), to a § 525 claim); Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. 
Metro Transp. Co. (In re Metro Transp. Co.), 64 B.R. 968, 975 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (“We 
further believe that the burden of proof in a discrimination charge under 11 U.S.C.
5(a) should be approached precisely as in a charge of discrimination in employment, 
housing, or public accommodations due to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
375 See Bell, 1987 WL 60286, at *3 (“It would be virtually impossible for a bankrupt to 
prove that her
ing a bankrupt to prove this scenario would
tcy Act.”). 
376 See In re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. at 975. 
377 See Bell, 1987 WL 60286, at *4; cf. Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination 
Law Thr
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 One court acknowledged that requiring employees to prove that 
no other factors triggered the discrimination makes it more difficult for 
bankruptcy filers to seek relief, but argued that an individual’s bank-
rupt status is different from the Title VII and Age Discrimination Act 
categories of race, sex, and age.378 The court stated that “there is not 
much one can do about his race, or sex, or age . . . but bankruptcy, 
while sometimes the result of catastrophic events over which the bank-
rupt has no control, often results from conduct as to which the bank-
rupt had a measure of choice.”379 Congress, according to the court, 
may have had in mind the mutability of one’s financial status in impos-
ing a higher standard of proof to bankruptcy discrimination cases than 
in Title VII or Age Discrimination Act cases.380 
b. Bankruptcy as a Critical Component of a Financial History Antidiscrimina-
tion Norm 
 As a result of courts’ narrow interpretations of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s antidiscrimination provisions, it is tremendously difficult for 
bankruptcy filers to successfully deter and counter discriminatory 
treatment by employers. According to a 2008 study, forty-five percent of 
debtors who were denied employment following bankruptcy reported 
that the employer’s decision was attributable to the bankruptcy filing.381 
The stark inconsistency between the Bankruptcy Code’s “fresh start” 
policy and its limited antidiscrimination protections underscores the 
need for legislative action: policymakers must clarify to what extent em-
ployers and licensing organizations can consider financial histories— 
including bankruptcy filings—in the employment and licensing process. 
 The normative factors I consider above provide helpful guidance 
about the merits of including bankruptcy within the scope of a stronger 
financial history antidiscrimination norm. First, the Fraud Hypothe-
sis—a frequently cited empirical justification for the use of financial 
histories in the employment setting382—may be less applicable to bank-
ruptcy filers than to individuals who have accumulated significant debts 
but who have not sought bankruptcy relief. Because bankruptcy results 
in a substantial decrease in an individual’s indebtedness, a bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                      
“concept of mixed motives provides an apt description of many instances of discrimina-
tion





380 See id. 
381 Thorne, supra note 17, at 36. 
382 See supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text.
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filer might pose a decreased security risk to a given institution.383 Thus, 
in spite of the tenuous connection between credit scores and an em-
ployee’s propensity to commit theft,384 those who subscribe to the 
Fraud Hypothesis may not necessarily oppose the application of an an-
dis
emium” necessary to protect all debtors 
                                                                                                                     
ti crimination rule to protect bankruptcy filers. 
 Second, although some may argue that bankruptcy promotes debt 
default, others contend that bankruptcy can increase economic pro-
ductivity. According to one commentator, the most compelling ration-
ale in support of bankruptcy is the ability of the bankruptcy discharge 
to restore the debtor to economic productivity and viable participation 
in the open credit economy.385 Consistent with this rationale, there may 
be appropriate reasons to limit the discharge (and, consequently, anti-
discrimination protection) in some cases.386 Although bankruptcy may 
ultimately increase the cost of credit, one may conceptualize these 
added costs as an “insurance pr
against the risk of default.387 
 Third, behavioral economists’ observations about financial deci-
sion making suggest that courts’ reluctance to construe the Bankruptcy 
Code’s antidiscrimination provisions as broadly as they interpret other 
anti-retaliation provisions may be misplaced. Many courts and employ-
ers seem willing to concede that certain “innocent” events like job loss-
es, medical problems, and separations or divorces are deserving of an-
tidiscrimination protection.388 The implication is that these innocent 
events, to the extent that they trigger an adverse financial status, are 
more analogous to immutable characteristics (e.g., race, age, and sex) 
that have traditionally received antidiscrimination protection. At the 
same time, other financial events (e.g., overspending) are perceived as 
mutable and products of rational choice. Behavioral economists’ find-
ings, however, demonstrate that most individuals predictably and sys-
tematically make cognitive errors that can trigger an adverse financial 
status.389 Thus, there may be reason to relax a seemingly tenuous di-
chotomy between events perceived to be “uncontrollable” and other 
 
383 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
384 See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
385 Howard, supra note 180, at 1069. 
386 Id. at 1070 (arguing that, consistent with the economic functions of discharge, dis-
charge should be denied to those debtors who, for example, knowingly hindered the 
bankruptcy proceedings or engaged in dishonesty). 
387 See id. at 1063. 
388 See EEOC, Oct. 20 Meeting Tr., supra note 165, at 32 (Devata). 
389 See supra notes 247–279 and accompanying text. 
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ad rse financial circumstances, like foreclosures or overspending, that 
trigger bankruptcies. 
 Fourth, pursuing stronger bankruptcy protections as part of a 
broader antidiscrimination reform effort may have a favorable impact 
on social mobility. As one commentator has explained, the bankruptcy 
discharge suspends or reverses the downward social mobility consumers 




 prohibited from considering specific finan-
al 
ited to bankruptcy filers, either for normative or pragmatic reasons. 
Bankruptcy is a preexisting, standardized form of debt-forgiveness. It is 
                                                                                                                     
390 Before 
bankruptcy, individuals suffer from a decline in wealth from (1) the 
compounding of existing debt through fees and interest, and (2) the 
loss of assets through foreclosure and repossession.391 A bankruptcy 
discharge alone, however, may be inadequate to prevent bankruptcy 
filers from experiencing subsequent financial distress. Scholars have 
established that sustained relief requires not only the forgiveness of 
past debts through the bankruptcy discharge, but also a stable and suf-
ficient post-bankruptcy income.392 To the extent that debtors’ pursuit 
of new jobs and careers is impaired by employers’ review of financial 
histories, a fortified bankruptcy antidiscrimination rule may reinforce 
bankruptcy’s promised “fresh start.” Although the application of a 
stronger antidiscrimination rule will not ensure debtors’ access to the 
income that some identify as indispensable to post
vi lity, antidiscrimination can reduce those barriers that may inevita-
bly complicate the search for a new job or career. 
 Finally, a comprehensive financial history antidiscrimination norm 
requires more than a prohibition on employers’ use of credit reports— 
a medium of information about applicants’ financial histories. The 
antidiscriminatory goal of such a prohibition could be easily circum-
vented, since employers may learn about financial events, like bank-
ruptcy filings, through other means, including from public records or 
from the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship between the em-
ployer and the applicant.393 Comprehensive protection for debtors thus 
requires that employers be
ci events—like bankruptcy filings—that they discover from sources 
other than credit reports. 
 Some may argue that antidiscrimination protection should be lim-
 
390 Thorne, supra note 17, at 24. 
391 Id. 
392 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 67, 93 (2006). 
393 See supra notes 26, 143 and accompanying text. 
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widely available and pursued by millions of Americans every year.394 
While the Bankruptcy Code makes key distinctions between different 
types of debts in its distribution of limited assets to creditors,395 all debt-
ors—whether seemingly profligate spenders or the victims of downsiz-
ing—can seek refuge under the Bankruptcy Code.396 Likewise, bank-
ruptcy’s collection functions and the repayment obligations it imposes 
on debtors in exchange for a discharge of debts397—part of an eco-
nomic quid pro quo—may make a fortified bankruptcy antidiscrimina-
tion rule more palatable to those who might otherwise tolerate dis-
crimination by employers or licensing organizations to deter debt 
default. In addition, mandating that employers not discriminate against 
bankruptcy filers reorients the conversation from the more divisive topic 
of employers’ freedom to treat a debt-defaulter differently to a more 
philosophical debate about the importance of ensuring, pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause, an individual’s full and unimpaired access to a dis-
charge of debt and a fresh start.398 
 While an effective financial history antidiscrimination norm must 
fully shield bankruptcy filers from employers’ extra-legal sanctions for 
debt default, comprehensive reform requires also that non-filers receive 
full antidiscrimination protection. Bankruptcy is standardized and 
broadly available, but, for several reasons, it may be underutilized. First, 
bankruptcy is a limited right. The Bankruptcy Code imposes various 
restrictions on a debtor’s right to discharge commonly held debts like 
student loans and home mortgage loans, limitations that can impact a 
debtor’s decision about whether to file for bankruptcy.399 Likewise, 
bankruptcy is very much a tool of middle class debtors, as many con-
sumers cannot afford to file.400 Some debtors who do not file for bank-
                                                                                                                      
 
394 See John Hartgen, Total Bankruptcy Filings Decrease 12 Percent in 2011, Commercial Filings 
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ruptcy instead pursue “informal bankruptcy.”401 Such debtors may not 
have any assets to forfeit to creditors and therefore may not derive any 
direct economic benefits from a bankruptcy discharge.402 Because, how-
ever, these individuals’ financial histories reveal various adverse events 
(e.g., collection actions or creditor lawsuits), non-filers nonetheless may 
require antidiscrimination protection in the employment setting. Con-
sequently, bankruptcy antidiscrimination protection is a necessary—but 
not sufficient—component of an effective and comprehensive financial 
history antidiscrimination norm. 
B. The Limitations of Consumer Empowerment 
 To address some of the problems triggered by the use of financial 
histories in the employment process, legislators could enhance the pro-
cedural protections available to prospective employees and licensees. 
Currently, some employers contend that they sometimes give applicants 
an opportunity to “explain” adverse information in their credit re-
ports.403 Instead of adopting a wholesale ban on employers’ considera-
tion of financial histories, legislators could require employers who con-
sult candidates’ credit reports to give candidates an opportunity to 
discuss any problematic items in their financial histories. This discussion 
would provide applicants with an opportunity to correct any consequen-
tial misperceptions. For example, applicants could identify significant 
errors in credit reports, or explain what unavoidable circumstances con-
tributed to a bankruptcy or a collection action. Applicants could also 
explain to prospective employers that a lawsuit or collection action is a 
result of a legitimate billing dispute rather than an attempted evasion of 
financial obligations. 
 On the one hand, increasing applicants’ participation in the as-
sessment process could help to reduce the rote and depersonalized na-
ture of employers’ review of credit histories. The reform would seem-
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ingly humanize the process by providing applicants with the opportunity 
to respond to “charges” leveled against them.404 In addition, an indi-
vidualized inquiry could reduce the unfairness that could otherwise re-
sult if an organization presumptively disqualified a candidate based 
upon adverse information in his or her credit report. In other words, 
allowing applicants to participate in the evaluation process could reduce 
the imprecision triggered by a third party’s power to make probabilistic 
inferences about a given individual based upon that individual’s posses-
sion of a particular trait.405 
 At the same time, however, increasing applicants’ participation in 
prospective employers’ review of financial histories unfairly places ap-
plicants on the defensive. The practice—similar to the FCRA approach 
toward employers’ use of financial histories—too readily presumes the 
existence of a link between an adverse financial history and a prospec-
tive employee’s merits.406 Institutionalizing candidates’ opportunity to 
respond to employer concerns could entrench and calcify existing ste-
reotypes about individuals who encounter financial calamity.407 It effec-
tively establishes a rebuttable presumption that errors in applicants’ 
financial histories constitute bona fide “red flags.” As a result, the re-
form could strengthen the debt-enforcement function of employers’ 
use of financial histories because it institutionalizes employers’ scrutiny 
of adverse financial events like bankruptcies or debt defaults.408 
 Such a reform is, at best, an incomplete solution. It is likely to be 
expensive and administratively onerous. Compliance would be difficult 
to monitor. It also presumes that employers would be able to distinguish 
effectively between “forgivable” adverse debt problems and more prob-
lematic ones.409 In addition, requiring employers to ask employees 
about adverse financial circumstances might require applicants to dis-
close information about their marital status or underlying medical con-
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ditions, which may raise other discrimination problems.410 Applying a 
heightened financial antidiscrimination norm to the employment set-
ting is a more blunt reform, but it would represent an informed societal 
and legal judgment about the wisdom and ethics of employers’ and li-
censing organizations’ consideration of candidates’ financial histories. 
C. Protecting Employers from the Consequences of False Stereotypes 
 Employers and licensing organizations face tremendous pressure 
to consult various sources of information about applicants. Licensing 
organizations, for example, may feel compelled to consult candidates’ 
backgrounds in order to prevent scandals and to limit legislatures from 
encroaching on their self-regulatory authority. Employers and em-
ployer advocates, in addition, contend that employers must conduct 
thorough background checks on applicants in order to forestall negli-
gent hiring claims.411 
 A survey of cases, however, reveals few—if any—successful negli-
gent hiring claims brought against employers for failure to consult 
credit reports or some other aspect of an employee’s financial his-
tory.412 This dearth of cases might suggest that employers are utilizing 
this rationale as a pretext. Alternatively or additionally, it may indicate 
that credit reporting agencies have successfully capitalized on a combi-
nation of (1) widely held preconceptions about those with adverse fi-
nancial histories, and (2) employers’ fear of liability. Indeed, credit re-
porting agencies regularly market consumer reports as prudent, 
money-saving risk-mitigation tools.413 
 The negligent hiring rationale demonstrates the extent to which 
preconceptions about the relevancy and validity of financial histories 
have been embraced by a risk-averse legal and administrative culture. 
When a preconception about a group is entrenched, antidiscrimination 
laws may be necessary not only to prevent the application of a stereo-
type against an individual, but also to protect the employer from con-
cerns about liability and loss that are fueled by third parties’ embrace 
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of the stereotype. Employers themselves may need robust financial his-
tory antidiscrimination laws to successfully reduce the real or perceived 
threat of lawsuits that are grounded in inaccurate narratives about 
debtors and debtor behavior. 
D. A Cautionary Note: Antidiscrimination’s Anti-Majoritarian Directive 
 The post-recession recovery period—marked by high unemploy-
ment414—has highlighted the normative and logical weaknesses of em-
ployers’ use of candidates’ financial histories in the evaluation process. 
Foreclosures and job losses have seemingly stricken households some-
what capriciously, and there is a widespread sense that “Main Street” 
consumers—relative to the “Wall Street” elite—have been systematically 
disadvantaged. Public officials have responded with various proposals 
to help ensure that consumers—particularly the long-term unem-
ployed—are not treated differently by employers.415 
 In the current tumultuous political and economic climate, a finan-
cial antidiscrimination norm caters to majoritarian and populist sympa-
thies. As a result, proposals to reduce the role of financial history in the 
employment process have gained traction. As of the time of this writing, 
seven states have passed laws that limit employers’ consideration of 
credit histories.416 
 In the aftermath of the Great Recession—a period of significant 
financial upheaval for millions of Americans—proposals advancing a 
stronger financial history antidiscrimination norm are more likely to 
induce change. At the same time, however, the timing of this move-
ment may, by oversimplifying its message, pose a philosophical di-
lemma. By promoting an enhanced antidiscrimination norm during a 
weak economy, policymakers may be sending a message that the harms 
of employers’ and licensing organizations’ use of financial histories are 
most acute and problematic during periods of high unemployment or 
widespread economic stress. While this message is not necessarily in-
correct, it is incomplete and reductionist. 
 The harms of financial history discrimination in the employment 
or licensing setting may be felt or perceived by the largest number of 
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people during a weak economy. In part, this may be because employers 
increase their scrutiny of financial histories during a competitive mar-
ket in which larger numbers of workers vie for a limited number of po-
sitions.417 It would be a mistake, however, for policymakers, employers, 
and judges to conclude that the need for antidiscrimination reform is 
transitory, or that job candidates’ need for greater antidiscrimination 
protections will predictably decline as economic conditions improve. 
 The normative harms of employers’ use of financial histories— 
most notably, threats to social mobility and to racial equality—are not 
unique to weak economies. Minority communities, for instance, take 
much longer to emerge from recessions.418 As a result, applicants’ need 
for financial history antidiscrimination protection will persist long after 
unemployment numbers decline. In addition, the empirical strengths 
and weaknesses of the practice—the ability of employers to make valid 
statistical deductions about employees’ personality traits—are unre-
lated to underlying economic conditions. 
 Thus, the timing of the financial history antidiscrimination reform 
movement is a double-edged sword. The currently weak economy and 
high unemployment numbers cause the issue to resonate with a large 
segment of the population, but genuine antidiscrimination reform ef-
forts must be unconstrained by prevailing majoritarian sentiments. 
Conclusion 
 Financial histories have an expansive and seemingly indelible im-
pact on individuals’ lives, extending far beyond the domain of access to 
credit. In recent years, an increasing number of employers and licens-
ing organizations have used credit reports and financial histories in as-
sessing a prospective employee’s or licensee’s merits. The recent reces-
sion has caused many to question the logic and ethics of that practice. 
 This Article examined the normative justifications of the use of 
financial histories in the employment and licensing settings. Although 
consideration of financial history may have a moderate economic bene-
fit by deterring debt default, important countervailing factors— includ-
ing the practice’s adverse impact on racial equality and social mobility, 
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and ambiguities about its empirical validity—justify the adoption of a 
more robust financial history antidiscrimination norm. Current laws, 
including the Fair Credit Reporting Act and state laws limiting employ-
ers’ use of financial histories, function to entrench prevailing stereo-
types about debtor behavior and to legitimize employers’ right to access 
applicants’ financial histories. Likewise, the Bankruptcy Code’s antidis-
crimination provisions provide only nominal protection to debtors—an 
omission that functions to erode the “fresh start” necessary to improve 
debtors’ financial futures. Research by behavioral economists suggests 
that it may be reasonable to analogize consumers’ adverse financial sta-
tuses to more traditional “immutable” categories (e.g., race, age, and 
sex) that receive more robust antidiscrimination protection under ex-
isting laws. 
 An enhanced financial history antidiscrimination norm will re-
quire employers and policymakers to question the usefulness of infor-
mation that for decades has been embraced as relevant and helpful. 
Adoption of fortified financial history antidiscrimination protections 
can promote racial and economic equality, give employers the freedom 
to focus on those qualities that have a demonstrated relationship to job 
success, and reduce the impact of dubious preconceptions about job 
applicants’ adverse financial backgrounds. 
